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Rural Transformation, Inequality, and the Origins of
Microfinance
Abstract
What determines the development of rural financial markets? Starting from a simple theoretical frame-
work, we derive the factors shaping the market entry of rural microfinance institutions across time and
space. We provide empirical evidence for these determinants using the expansion of credit cooperatives
in the 236 eastern counties of Prussia between 1852 and 1913. This setting is attractive as it provides a
free market benchmark scenario without public ownership, subsidization, or direct regulatory intervention.
Furthermore, we exploit features of our historical set-up to identify causal effects. The results show that
declining agricultural staple prices, as a feature of structural transformation, leads to the emergence of
credit cooperatives. Similarly, declining bank lending rates contribute to their rise. Low asset sizes and
land inequality inhibit the regional spread of cooperatives, while ethnic heterogeneity has ambiguous ef-
fects. We also offer empirical evidence suggesting that credit cooperatives accelerated rural transformation
by diversifying farm outputs.
JEL classification G21 · N23 · O16 · Q15
Keywords microfinance · credit cooperatives · rural transformation · land inequality · Prussia
1 Introduction
An influential literature stresses the role of finance for growth (King and Levine, 1993;
Guiso et al., 2004; Lehmannn-Hasemeyer and Wahl, 2017; Heblich and Trew, 2018).
However, we know little about the factors that originally gave rise to differences in finan-
cial development, and we know even less about the determinants of financial development
over time.2 Weak financial development is a particular concern in developing countries,
especially in rural regions, where large segments of the population are unbanked, and ac-
cess to financial services could potentially bring the greatest benefit (Burgess and Pande,
2005).
In this paper, we explain the rise and spread of micro finance institutions (MFIs), which
are often seen as key institutions in providing financial services to rural areas (Armendariz
and Morduch, 2010). Modern data show strikingly large differences in the spread of mi-
crofinance even within the same country.3 Only a relatively small literature has attempted
to explain this differential spread of small scale credit institutions across time and space
2When attention to the origins of financial development is paid, the aforementioned literature often focuses on one time-invariant
factor that can be used to instrument financial development.
3In India, for example, calculations on MIX Market data reveal the number of rural inhabitants per microfinance access point to
differ substantially between districts. By this definition, outreach differs on average by a factor of 25 between the district with maximum
and minimum coverage within the same state.
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(Rajan and Ramcharan, 2011; Ahlin et al., 2011; Vanroose, 2016; Colvin et al., 2018;
Jaremski and Fishback, 2018). Although these contributions have added insight on the im-
portance of individual variables, the choice of explanatory variables is often not informed
by theory, and it is unclear how important individual variables are relative to each other.4
Another fundamental challenge is simultaneity bias: MFI performance or market entry
are observed at the same time as many of the explanatory variables, impeding causal in-
ference. Moreover, as the universe of MFIs is rarely observable, and sampling is usually
performed according to the quality of MFI records, selection bias may loom large. Fi-
nally, many studies performing tests on modern data pool MFIs operating under different
ownership structures, regulatory frameworks, and subsidy schemes (Morduch, 1999). Yet
how would micro finance develop without public ownership, subsidization, and under a
minimal regulatory environment?
We present what we believe to be as close as possible to such a free market benchmark
scenario: the rapid rise and spread of credit cooperatives in 19th century rural Germany.
These cooperatives provided small scale savings and loan services to previously unbanked
populations. Crucially, they were owned by their members, did not receive subsidies, and
were subject to a minimal regulatory framework, the changes in which we can control
for (Guinnane, 2003). Moreover, because we observe the de novo creation of an entire
system of microcredit, we observe most of our independent variables before the appear-
ance of MFIs. This mitigates simultaneity bias. We further strengthen the causality of our
arguments by using a range of instrumental variables.
Geographically, we focus on the eastern periphery of Germany before World War I, a
setting that has a number of desirable features for our analysis. Its population was compar-
atively poor, rural, had restricted access to the emerging banking system of the time, and
was marked by ethnic and economic inequality. Credit cooperatives thrived in this setting,
being among the very first institutions world-wide to develop the principle of small-scale
joint liability lending. As such, they influenced the development of micro finance in con-
temporary developing countries (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). The microeconomic
mechanisms that enabled credit cooperatives to successfully provide small-scale credit
has also been the focus of extensive research (Banerjee et al., 1994; Ghatak and Guinnane,
1999; Guinnane, 2001). We are able to build on these contributions to formulate a simple
model of the emergence of credit cooperatives.
The basic argument in this theoretical framework is as follows. Faced with a decline
in the relative prices of agricultural staples, grain farmers have an incentive to switch to
4An exception to the latter point is Ahlin et al. (2011), who do comprehensively consider the dynamic macroeconomic context in
which MFIs expand.
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goods whose relative prices are rising (figure 1a and 1b). Switching production requires
capital, but farmers are credit-constrained in the sense that they cannot access bank loans
unless their private assets exceed a certain threshold. The possibility of pooling assets then
provides the incentive to form credit cooperatives. Over time, therefore, the development
of rural credit institutions will be determined by the relative output prices of agricultural
goods (figure 1c). However, the emergence of cooperatives is constrained by their cost
of capital, which decreases in group size and members’ assets, but increases in members’
ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, the bank lending rate, and economic inequality.5 Variation
in these factors essentially determines the regional spread of microfinance institutions.
We test these predictions using a newly collected data set containing the universe of
4,941 credit cooperatives in the six eastern provinces of the Kingdom of Prussia, which
was the largest state of the German Empire at that time. We use this data to construct a
panel of 236 eastern Prussian counties, where the number of credit cooperatives entering
the market per year at the county level is our main dependent variable.6 Our analysis spans
the entire period from the founding of the first credit cooperative in 1852 until 1913, the
last year before the War. The results strongly support the predictions of the model: credit
cooperatives are more likely to be founded in regions marked by large farms sizes and
commercial banking infrastructure, and less likely to emerge where the land distribution
is unequal. Over time, interest rates and relative grain prices are strong predictors of the
development of the small scale credit sector. These results are robust to controlling for a
wide range of variables, checking for simultaneity bias, and utilizing instrumental variable
procedures. Finally, we show how our parsimonious set of predictors successfully explains
a large share of the variation in cooperative credit institutions in both the cross section and
time dimension.
We link the decline in relative grain prices we observe in the data to an influential
literature stressing the role of income effects in the process of structural transformation
(Kongsamut et al., 2001; Timmer, 2007; Herrendorf et al., 2014). This literature often
shows how non-homothetic consumer preferences lead to a decline in the relative demand
for agricultural staples as consumer incomes rise (Engel’s Law). Moreover, in an open
economy, the price of staples, which are to a higher degree tradeable, is also influenced by
(potentially lower) world market prices. Declining relative demand and import competi-
tion thus lead to a decline in the relative price of basic agricultural goods against capital-
intensive goods. This provides an incentive to exit agriculture, thus shifting labor into
5Once the number of cooperatives in a region is allowed to exceed 1, the prediction for ethno-linguistic heterogeneity is theoretically
ambiguous, as heterogeneity can make it advantageous to split cooperatives according to ethnicity.
6We also have access to detailed balance sheet data for a small group of cooperatives.
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Figure 1: Rural transformation in Prussia, 1852-1913. Six eastern provinces, grain refers to rye and wheat,
weighted by their initial land shares. Source: production data from v. Finckenstein (1960), other sources see
text. Calculations: authors.
capital-intensive sectors (Uy et al., 2013; Teignier, 2018). We stress that a similar process
was at work within 19th century agriculture. Declining prices for staple grains led farmers
to exit that sector in favor of more capital-intensive meat and dairy production, a process
we term "rural transformation". Apart from showing that relative grain prices crucially de-
termined the creation of credit cooperatives, we provide suggestive quantitative evidence
that these cooperatives indeed aided rural transformation. They did so by helping to set up
production cooperatives that produced more capital-intensive agricultural products such as
milk and meat (figure 1d). This conclusion is further supported by our examination of the
Prussian cattle statistics. Such a mechanism is in line with the observations of qualitative
economic historians (Kindleberger, 1951), but has to the best of our knowledge not been
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empirically investigated. As such, we provide a novel perspective that focuses on the role
of MFIs in aiding transformation in developing rural regions.
Our paper is also related to a long-standing debate in the micro finance literature re-
garding the existence of a tradeoff between outreach and financial sustainability of MFIs
(Hermes et al., 2018; Cull et al., 2007). This literature focuses on the role of subsidies
or regulation in affecting outreach and survival probability. While our measure of market
entry of credit cooperatives is informative with regard to notions of outreach, we do not
have anything to say about the survival of our cooperatives. This is both a feature of our
data, as we do not observe failing institutions, and a feature of our historical setting: credit
cooperatives in 19th century Germany had negligible failure rates (Banerjee et al., 1994).
While this is an important caveat, it also provides us with a attractive empirical setting, as
attrition is ruled out.
A further theme that is connected to our work is the market structure of the small-scale
finance industry. In particular, the literature has analysed the interactions of micro-lenders
and banks on market outcomes (Cull et al., 2014; Périlleux et al., 2016). We offer evidence
to show that the relationship between both types of institutions is complementary, at least at
the point of MFI entry. Intimately related to this is a strand of the literature that empirically
analyzes the determinants of institutional features of MFIs, such as the liability structure
(Banerjee et al., 1994; de Quidt et al., 2018). We primarily focus on the determinants of
MFI entry over space and time, rather than focusing on its institutional structure. We do,
however, show that changes in nation-wide liability laws had a large effect on market entry
decisions.
A final strand of literature we contribute to analyzes the effects of ethnic and eco-
nomic heterogeneity on the participation in clubs. In a pioneering paper, Alesina and
La Ferrara (2000) show that high levels of ethnic and income inequality are empirically
associated with lower participation in social clubs in US cities, with ethnic heterogene-
ity being the most important driver. Similarly, La Ferrara (2002) finds that an unequal
distribution of assets decreases club participation in Tanzanian villages, while Barr et al.
(2015) find economic inequalities and ethnicity did not significantly affect the formation
of community-based organizations in Zimbabwean villages. Similar arguments have been
made less formally for the formation of production cooperatives in industrializing Eu-
rope. For example, O’Rourke (2007) argues that ethno-confessional fragmentation and an
unequal distribution of land was decisive in holding back dairy cooperatives in Ireland.
Fernandez (2014) finds some evidence that land inequality decreased the output produced
by production cooperatives in Europe before the Second World War. Similarly to Alesina
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and La Ferrara (2000) and La Ferrara (2002) we model the formation of clubs, but we do
this specifically for credit cooperatives, rather than social clubs. Furthermore, we stress
that the formation of these clubs cannot be understood by solely looking at time-invariant
heterogeneity, but that changes in economic conditions are key drivers of club formation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our conceptual
framework, while section 3 outlines how we take the predictions of that framework to
the data. Section 4 analyzes the results, and provides an assessment as to the relative
importance of individual determinants of the growth of microcredit institutions. The final
section concludes.
2 Conceptual framework
We model one region populated by 𝑁 small agricultural producers. Producers are identi-
cal, with the exception of speaking different languages 𝐴,𝐵 so that 𝑁𝐴+𝑁𝐵 = 𝑁 .7 Pro-
ducers choose between producing two goods: a land-intensive agricultural staple ‘grain’
and a capital-intensive output which we refer to as ‘dairy’ . Initially, farmers produce the
agricultural staple only. For simplicity, we assume that each good uses only one specific
factor of production:
𝑌𝑔 = 𝑍
𝛼
𝑌𝑑 = 𝐾
𝛽
(1)
where 𝑍 are land inputs and 𝐾 capital inputs.8 Being small, each producer maximizes
profits given both output prices {𝑃𝑔, 𝑃𝑑} and input prices for land and capital {𝑥, 𝑟}. Total
profits are:
Π = 𝜋𝑔 + 𝜋𝑑
𝜋𝑔 = 𝑃𝑔𝑍
𝛼 − 𝑥𝑍
𝜋𝑑 = 𝑃𝑑𝐾
𝛽 − 𝑟𝐾
(2)
7We further relax the assumption of identical producers below by allowing for asset inequalities.
8The assumption of specific factors eases the exposition of the model, but the results would carry through if we allowed capital to be
mobile between sectors, as long as the production of the ‘dairy’ good is more capital intensive. This would echo the Hansen-Prescott
approach to Unified Growth Theory, which seeks to model the structural transformation from an agricultural Malthusian to an industrial
Solovian economy (Hansen and Prescott, 2002).
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2.1 Cooperatives and the cost of capital
We are primarily interested in the procurement of capital. Farmers can receive a loan for
the capital 𝐾 that maximises profits 𝜋𝑑 from a conventional bank at the rate of 𝑟𝑏 against
their private collateral 𝑞. However, we assume that banks are only willing to lend at the
rate 𝑟𝑏 if a borrower’s collateral exceeds a certain threshold: 𝑞 ≥ 𝑞𝑇 . This may reflect the
fact that banks possess limited information on borrower quality, or face fixed monitoring
costs, which makes dealing with lowly collaterized individuals unprofitable (Ghosh et al.,
2000). The implication of this market imperfection will be that some farmers are credit
constrained by a lack of collateral (Karlan and Morduch, 2009).
Producers for whom 𝑞 < 𝑞𝑇 can overcome their lack of private collateral by pooling
assets with other producers (Banerjee et al., 1994). Allowing 𝑁𝑐 ≤ 𝑁 farmers to join such
a cooperative, the cooperative’s total assets are then 𝑄 = 𝑞𝑁𝑐.9 We assume that the cost
of capital 𝑟𝑐 to each producer inside the cooperative decreases in both 𝑞 and 𝑁𝑐. There are
three motivations for this scale effect. Firstly, the cooperative may act as both a credit and
savings institution, and extend loans to members primarily on internal deposits. In this
case, increasing cooperative size may reduce the likelihood of negative shocks to individ-
ual members’ assets (Guinnane, 1997). Secondly, pooled assets can be used by the cooper-
ative as collateral against which to obtain loans from banks or other financial institutions.
Assuming that bank rates are inversely proportional to the amount of collateral provided,
pooling will lower the rate obtained. Moreover, given joint liability systems under which
members guarantee loans reciprocally, more guarantors implies a higher likelihood that
loans will be paid back (which may also improve access to third party financing) (Ahlin,
2015). Therefore, 𝑞 and 𝑁 can be thought of as substitutes: cooperatives can be smaller
in wealthier regions where deposits are high, but large group sizes are required if average
deposits are small.
However, the cooperative is only able to fulfill these functions if it has access to either
local information on its members (Guinnane, 2001) or to an enforcement mechanism, such
as joint liability lending (Ghatak and Guinnane, 1999). Both may be hampered by existing
ethno-linguistic, religious or other cultural differences in the population.10 In our model,
we focus on the extent to which gathering information on and monitoring members is more
difficult in the presence of communication costs (Guinnane, 2001), which are likely to run
9In practice, roughly a third of cooperative loans were directly collateralized (by land), whereas much of the remainder was guar-
anteed by co-signers, who had to pledge land or other property, the value of which sometimes exceeded the amount of the loan. See
historical appendix G, section G.4.
10 Ghatak and Guinnane (1999, p. 196) refer to this as “(...) the general idea that people with connections of shared locality or other
bonds based on kinship and occupation may be able to support credit contracts that would be impossible with conventional banking
practices.” (emphasis added)
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along ethno-linguistic lines.11 We therefore assume 𝑟𝑐 to be increasing in a cooperative’s
ethno-linguistic heterogeneity 𝐻𝑐, defined as:
𝐻𝑐 = 1−
⃒⃒⃒⃒
𝑁𝐴,𝑐
𝑁𝑐
− 𝑁𝐵,𝑐
𝑁𝑐
⃒⃒⃒⃒
(3)
where 𝑁𝐴,𝑐 is the number of club members that belong to ethno-linguistic group 𝐴.
Note that 0 ≤ 𝐻𝑐 ≤ 1 by this definition. In sum, therefore, we have for the cost of capital
in the credit cooperative:
𝑟𝑐 = 𝑓(𝑞,𝑁𝑐, 𝐻𝑐) (4)
where 𝑓𝑞(.) < 0, 𝑓𝑁(.) < 0, 𝑓𝐻(.) > 0.
The cost of capital each producer faces is a decreasing function of private assets or
collateral 𝑞, which by virtue of assumption is identical to the club’s average collateral. The
remainder of 𝑟𝑐 is determined by the the characteristics of the cooperative: the benefits of
group size, and the costs of heterogeneity.
2.2 Cooperatives and rural transformation
We now impose some structure on the determinants of 𝑟𝑐. One possible reformulation of
equation 4 is as follows:
𝑟𝑐 = 𝑟𝑏 +
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁𝑐
+𝐻𝑐 ∀ 𝑞 < 𝑞𝑇 (5)
where 0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1 is the degree to which a cooperative’s total assets 𝑞𝑁𝑐 decrease capital
costs. This explicit formulation is attractive for two reasons. Firstly, the parameter 𝛿 can
reflect institutional factors such as the liability structure the co-op chooses, which may be
dependent on the legal framework (Banerjee et al., 1994). Changes in the legal framework
would therefore influence the cost of capital of all cooperatives through this parameter.
Secondly, equation 5 embodies the idea that at the limit, if cooperative membership is ho-
mogenous (𝐻𝑐 = 0), the cost of capital approaches the bank rate as club size 𝑁𝑐 becomes
very large.12
11Alternatively, one could think of social capital Karlan (2007) being smaller between members of different ethno-linguistic groups.
12Using micro-data on 135 credit cooperatives for which balance sheet information is available from police records (Polizei Präsidium
Posen, 1909), we have also tested whether the relationships implied in equation 5 hold empirically. The results show a negative, though
not always statistically significant, relationship between the cost of capital at the co-op level and capital stock per member, as well as
between the cost of capital and the total number of members. We do not observe heterogeneity at the co-op level, nor bank rates in this
particular data set.
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What factors will determine the emergence of cooperatives? Farmers for whom 𝑞 < 𝑞𝑇
will found a credit cooperative to enter capital intensive production and exit grain produc-
tion if 𝜋𝑑 ≥ 𝜋𝑔. Substituting 5 into 2 yields:
𝑃𝑑𝐾
𝛽 − (𝑟𝑏 + 1
𝛿𝑞𝑁𝑐
+𝐻𝑐)𝐾 ≥ 𝑃𝑔𝑍𝛼 − 𝑥𝑍 (6)
Under the (temporary) assumption that only one cooperative can be founded, the region’s
demographics will mirror cooperative membership in equation 6 (𝑁 = 𝑁𝑐, 𝐻 = 𝐻𝑐).13
Simple comparative statics then indicate that:
PROPOSITION 1
1. A decline in relative grain prices (𝑃𝑔/𝑃𝑑) shifts resources to the capital-intensive
sector and will therefore lead to an increase in demand for cooperative credit. This
mechanism is reflected in the pattern in figures 1 in the introduction, and predicts an
important role for cooperatives in driving rural transformation.
2. A decrease in bank interest rates 𝑟𝑏 or an increase in the pool of members𝑁𝑐 increases
the likelihood of cooperatives being founded.
3. Low levels of private assets 𝑞 will prevent farmers from assembling enough assets in a
cooperative. Cooperatives are therefore more likely to appear in wealthier regions.14
However, this is only true as long as 𝑞 < 𝑞𝑇 , as otherwise producers would turn
to bank rather than cooperative credit. In sum, we would expect a hump-shaped
relationship between 𝑞 and co-op emergence.
2.3 Heterogeneity and endogenous number of co-ops
According to equation 6, a very heterogeneous population can prohibit the shift to 𝑌𝑑 and
deter cooperative formation. This prediction would be in line with the results of the empir-
ical literature stressing the difficulties of cooperatives to form in heterogeneous societies
(O’Rourke, 2007). However, as the theoretical literature on fragmentation and club par-
ticipation (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) stresses, this prediction no longer holds once the
13𝐻 is the heterogeneity in the regional population, defined analogously to equation 3.
14Even today, collateral still features heavily in microfinance. For example, Banerjee et al. (2015) report that half of surveyed
lenders requested some collateral from borrowers in modern settings, in some cases in contravention of lender’s guidelines. Note that
cooperatives in the 19th century also demanded a capital contribution from members. In our data, the minimum size of this contribution
is 10 Mark, roughly equivalent to 2 weeks’ wages for agricultural laborers in the poorer counties.
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number of clubs is allowed to exceed 1. In this case, heterogeneity presents an incentive
to segregate by ethnicity, which can lead to more clubs being founded. In particular, it
can be shown that forming two (ethnically segregated) rather than one (ethnically mixed)
cooperative lowers the cost of capital under certain conditions:
PROPOSITION 2
Founding two rather than one cooperative will minimize 𝑟𝑐 if:
𝑞𝐻𝑁𝑁 >
1
𝛿
Therefore, the number of cooperatives can increase in regional population heterogeneity.
PROOF: Appendix
The interpretation is straightforward. The higher heterogeneity in the population, the more
costly one mixed club becomes, and the more attractive it is to found two separate coopera-
tives. Differently from before, the number of cooperatives will now increase in population
heterogeneity. The relationship between heterogeneity and the number of cooperatives is
therefore theoretically ambiguous.
The other variables in Proposition 2 work in the same direction as in Proposition 1: the
larger the population, the more viable two segregated (and therefore smaller) clubs will
be. Finally, higher levels of collateral in a region will decrease the need for producers to
pool resources, so two smaller segregated clubs are more efficient.
2.4 Inequality
We now allow private assets to differ within the region’s population. For simplicity, we
assume that individual assets follow a uniform distribution 𝑞𝑖 ∼ 𝑈(𝑞, 𝑞). We let the mean
of the distribution be equal to the regional mean used in the previous sections (𝑞 = (𝑞+𝑞)
2
).
Given constant population𝑁 , this also implies that total assets in the region are unchanged.
However, inequality can now affect co-op formation through its influence on a coopera-
tive’s assets, which can be expressed as:
𝑄 =
∫︁ 𝑞
𝑞
(︂
𝑁
𝑞 − 𝑞
)︂
𝑑𝑞 −
∫︁ 𝑞
𝑞𝑇
(︂
𝑁
𝑞 − 𝑞
)︂
𝑑𝑞 (7)
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Conditional on mean assets being below the threshold for bank financing, higher asset in-
equality implies an increasing 𝑞 in equation 7. This increases the size of the second term,
and thus decreases cooperative assets. As we know that co-op formation increases with
co-op assets from Proposition 1, it follows that:
PROPOSITION 3
For constant mean assets, asset inequality decreases credit cooperative formation condi-
tional on 𝑞 < 𝑞𝑇 .
Intuitively, inequality pushes a larger fraction of the population over the collateral bar-
rier 𝑞𝑇 required to obtain formal bank financing, and therefore decreases the total assets
available for pooling to the remaining co-op members.15 The effect of inequality will be
even larger, if in addition, a minimum level of assets are required for participation due to
mandatory capital contributions. If the mean 𝑞 is held constant, an increasing 𝑞 implies
a falling 𝑞, and therefore increases the fraction of the population who will not qualify for
participating in the club.16
In summary then, we expect that credit cooperatives form in response to falling relative
grain prices, as well as low bank interest rates. Moreover, we expect to find more credit
cooperatives in regions with lower land inequality and higher private assets, although this
latter relationship is likely to be hump-shaped. The relationship with ethno-linguistic het-
erogeneity is theoretically ambiguous.
3 Data and empirical strategy
3.1 Sample: Prussia’s six eastern provinces
Our sample comprises the 236 counties that made up the six eastern provinces of the
Kingdom of Prussia in the half-century before World War I. Figure 2a shows the location
of these provinces within the Kingdom of Prussia, which from 1871 onward was part of
the German Empire.17 These six provinces are often grouped together on account of their
15 This prediction is in line with La Ferrara (2002), who shows that rising asset inequality leads to less participation in clubs in
developing countries, because the wealthy have less to gain from joining.
16For most of the analysis, we interpret higher inequality as implying a larger mass of assets in the upper tail of the distribution,
although we do relax this interpretation to investigate the entire asset distribution in empirical section 2.
17Each province was subdivided into two or three districts (Regierungsbezirke), most of which encompassed between 12-20 counties.
See table D.1 for the administrative divisions of Prussia.
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geographic location east of the river Elbe, and their joint history as destinations of German
settlement and military expansion since the High Middle Ages, thus forming a coherent
sample for analysis.18
Geography and this settlement history resulted in the creation of large landed estates
and a predominantly rural orientation of the economy that marked the six provinces well
into the 20th century (Cinirella and Hornung, 2016). Even in 1883, 50% of arable land was
devoted to growing staple grains. However, rural transformation was gathering pace from
the mid-19th century onwards. Berlin, one of the fastest growing urban agglomerations of
the time, was located within Brandenburg, the westernmost of the six provinces. Urban
demand for foodstuffs, especially dairy, meats, vegetables and alcohols, was expanding
(Burhop, 2011). By rural standards, these were capital-intensive sectors.19 At the same
time, the import competition from land-abundant grain producers in the New World was
intensifying, as advances in shipping technology outpaced protectionist measures by Ger-
man policy makers (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2009). The consequence of increasing relative
demand for non-staple foods, and of import competition in grains, was the downwards
trend in grain prices identified in Figure 1.
The medieval proliferation of landed estates in the six provinces had resulted in high
levels of land-, and hence wealth inequality. Inequality had persisted despite the official
liberation of the peasants in 1807 and despite the fact that many had become independent
freeholders by the 1850s (Eddie, 2008).
Demographically, Prussia’s eastern provinces were highly diverse. Some had been an-
nexed by Prussia from the Polish Commonwealth in the late 18th century and therefore
contained large Polish-speaking populations. Ethno-linguistic cleavages between Poles
and Germans also largely correlated with religious divisions, with Poles being almost
exclusively Catholic, and Germans predominantly Protestant.20 Jews constituted a third
religious group in some regions, although their mean share had fallen to below 1% by the
outbreak of World War I due to emigration.
Finally, the six provinces witnessed an unprecedented boom in the foundation of credit
cooperatives. Credit cooperatives originated in the early 1850s following the activities of
two pioneers, Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen and Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch in western re-
18In German historiography, these provinces are often jointly referred to as "East Elbia", a categorization that goes back to the
writings of Max Weber (1892). See historical appendix, section G.1.
19O’Rourke (2007) mentions dairy creameries in Denmark requiring the milk of at least 400 cows to profitably operate technological
innovations such as the cream separator. Procuring cattle was a significant expense for rural populations in Prussia too: In 1883, the
price of a single head of beef cattle stood at roughly 187 Mark. Evaluated at the average rural wage rate, this translated into roughly
149 days of labor (See historical appendix, section G.2 for more information).
20The correlation between the share of Catholics and Polish speakers at the county level is 0.72.
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gions of Germany.21 While Schulze-Delitzsch focused on urban craftsmen, and Raiffeisen
on rural populations, both emphasized the principle of joint-liability lending to overcome
the credit constraints of previously unbanked populations (Faust, 1965b). Although mem-
bership was required to receive a loan from a credit cooperative, the capital contribution
required for membership was relatively small and the co-ops savings facilities were of-
ten available for non-members too.(Banerjee et al., 1994) Membership was open to all by
residents of a locality and locals constituted the majority of directors and officers of the
co-op. As a cooperative only operated in a closely circumscribed locality, and meetings
were held in public, lenders and borrowers knew each other (Guinnane, 2001).22
As is visible from Figure 2b, credit cooperatives were highly successful in attracting
members, with close to 10% of the population being members at the end of our sample
period in 1913. Most importantly for our purposes, there is extensive variation in the
spread of cooperatives even between adjacent counties.
(a) The six eastern provinces of Prussia (b) Credit cooperative members per capita, 1913
Figure 2: Provinces, counties and cooperatives in the sample
3.2 Dependent variable: Credit cooperatives
The main data source on credit cooperatives is the ‘Address Book of Purchasing and
Economic Cooperatives in the German Empire’ as produced by the central Prussian co-
operative bank (Preußische Central-Genossenschafts-Kasse, 1915). This publication, which
21The first credit cooperative in our sample was founded in 1852.
22More detailed information on the institutional structure of credit cooperatives is provided in the historical appendix, section G.4.
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to the best of our knowledge has not been used before, provides the location and type of
each cooperative in Imperial Germany, the year of its foundation, the number of mem-
bers, the sum for which its members are liable, and the association to which it adheres.
We use this data to construct a panel consisting of the number of credit cooperatives for
each county from 1852 to 1913. This produces the data plotted in Figures 1 and E.1a.
As we observe only cooperatives active in 1915, we do not observe failing cooperatives.
Fortunately, our theory concerns the foundation of cooperatives, rather than their demise
and apart from a brief episode in the 1880s, failure rates of credit cooperatives were be-
low 1 in 1000 (Banerjee et al., 1994; Guinnane, 2001). Nonetheless, this limitation of our
data implies we are not in a position to investigate cyclical patterns of booms and busts
in cooperative operation, and focus on long-term growth in the number of cooperatives
instead.
We use the same source to construct a panel of non-financial cooperatives, which we
use as a robustness check. The most important of these are production cooperatives, which
were set up by farmers to jointly produce capital intensive goods such as dairy, meat,
alcohol; that is those goods described by 𝑌𝑑 in our model.
3.3 Independent variables
3.3.1 Prices
The theory developed in section 2 predicts that declines in relative grain prices should
increase cooperative credit. We use data on German rye and wheat prices from the official
Prussian statistics (Preußisches Statistisches Landesamt, 1907, 1925). Rye and wheat are
the staple grains most affected by import competition and changing urban demand, and
are thus most suited to studying rural transformation.23 We deflate German rye and wheat
prices by the Germany-wide consumer price index calculated by Kuczynski (1961), so that
we evaluate the evolution of grain prices relative to all other prices.24
A change in grain price defined in this way will be equal for all counties. However,
exposure to this price shock will differ locally as the initial reliance on rye or wheat culti-
vation differs between counties, and because wheat and rye prices may move differently.25
We therefore weigh relative wheat and rye prices in our price index using the share of total
23Barley was produced only in relatively small quantities, while oats were partly used as an animal feed.
24The results are similar when using the price of a single good, such as butter, as a deflator (see column (6) in table F.3). While this
is closer to the price ratio 𝑃𝑔/𝑃𝑑 in the model’s Proposition 1, it does not capture the full range of goods that producers could switch
to, which included not only dairy, but also meats, alcohols, and even proto-industrial textiles.
25Map E.1c displays the cross-sectional variation in grain cultivation at the county level. The majority of this was rye cultivation,
although there are large differences between counties in the crop composition (see summary statistics in table B.2). Graph C.1 displays
the movement of the difference between rye and wheat prices over time.
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land in each county dedicated to wheat and rye production 𝑍 𝑟𝑦𝑒, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 . This captures the
degree to which each county was potentially affected by global grain price movements:
𝑃 𝑟𝑒𝑙. 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖, 𝑡 =
(︂
𝑃 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑡
𝑃 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝑍 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖
)︂
+
(︂
𝑃 𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑡
𝑃 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝑍 𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑖
)︂
(8)
In most specifications, we employ land use data from 1878, which is the earliest year
for which county-level data is available from Meitzen (1901). As land use itself could
change as a response to price shocks, we also calculate land use at the beginning of our
sample (1852) from province level data, but this does not affect the estimates (see column
(2)-(4) in table F.3).26
The resulting price index was plotted in Figure 1c in the introduction. Clearly, the
series is non-stationary, with the attendant risk of spurious results. We therefore difference
the series once to arrive at Δ𝑃 𝑟𝑒𝑙. 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖, 𝑡 . Finally, it seems reasonable to expect that not just
the contemporaneous change in prices affects credit cooperative growth, but recent lags as
well. This may be because farmers react to a number of adverse price shocks over recent
years, or because setting up a cooperative takes time. Our main explanatory variable "grain
prices" is therefore a moving total of Δ𝑃 𝑟𝑒𝑙. 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖, 𝑡 over the current and past five years.
27 The
differenced price series, and its moving five-year total are plotted in Figure C.2.
3.3.2 Asset size and inequality
Our conceptual framework stresses the role of mean assets per capita 𝑞 in a region, as well
as asset inequality. We use farm size as a proxy for assets. There are three reasons for
doing so. Firstly, in an agricultural economy, land is arguably the most important asset.
Other assets, such as farm buildings are likely to be correlated with land holdings (Eddie,
2008). Secondly, land is used as collateral in financial transactions, for example when
taking a bank loan. Thirdly, land holdings are likely to be correlated with income, which
determines the ability to repay loans and make savings deposits.28 We utilize the 1882 land
26The results also carry through when we instrument land use with exogenous variation in soil suitability in column (5) in table F.3.
Specifically, we instrument 𝑍 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 with the share of fertile land from Meitzen (1901), and 𝑍
𝑟𝑦𝑒
𝑖 with the remaining share of land.
27The results are very similar if we enter each lag of Δ𝑃 𝑟𝑒𝑙. 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖, 𝑡 separately into the regression, but the exposition and reading of
the results is significantly eased by using one cumulative total. The results are also robust to including a different number of lags than
the 5-period cut-off.
28Losch et al. (2011) report that farm size is still the major determinant of rural incomes in a broad cross section of developing
countries. In our context, one might worry that farm value, rather than size, matters. The value of land could trend downward as
demand for land slackens. However, interacting farm sizes with decade time trends does not reveal such patterns. Similarly, proxying
for farm values by interacting farm size with soil quality, industrialization, demographic variables, or market potential (Kopsidis and
Wolf, 2012) does not greatly affect the coefficients on farm size (table F.2).
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census as collected in the iPEH-Database (Becker et al., 2014) to calculate mean farm size
by simply dividing a county’s total farmland in hectares by the total number of farms.
For asset inequality, we utilize the same data source. The data divides all farmland in
a county into six size categories, and provides the amount of land in each category. Our
preferred measure is simply the share of arable land in a county held by estates in the
largest category (over 100 ha). This is consistent with the spirit of 𝑞 in the model and the
treatment of inequality as upper-tail inequality.29 As a robustness check, we also compute
a Gini index of farm size inequality, by calculating the area under a discrete Lorenz curve
of all six size categories, as well as experimenting with different cut-offs, but the results
turn out to be insensitive to these alterations.
3.3.3 Population and heterogeneity
All demographic data stems from the official Prussian censuses, collected by Belzyt (1998).
The censuses provide population totals, as well as the breakdown by ethnic and religious
groups for each county. For most counties, ten census results are available between 1858
and 1910. We linearly interpolate the data between census years.30 Although we some-
times allow population to vary over time, we use fixed 1890 population figures in most
specifications. This is the census that is available for all counties, and avoids spurious
results due to trending population numbers. We also use 1852 numbers (column (6) in ta-
ble F.1) as a robustness check to forestall the possibility that population itself might adjust
to price shocks, for example through migration.
According to our theory, communication costs are more likely to be present when both
ethnicities are of roughly equal size. An index of ethnic fractionalisation is one way of
capturing these non-linearities. We calculate a generalized formulation of the heterogene-
ity index in equation 3 that allows for more than two groups (although in the majority of
counties, Germans and Poles are the only groups present). For county 𝑖 we compute our
fractionalization index as:
𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑖 = 1−
𝐾∑︁
𝑘=1
(︂
𝑁𝑘,𝑖
𝑁𝑖
)︂2
(9)
29Land in this category was officially denoted as Grossgrundbesitz (large estate) in Prussia. The measure largely follows Cinirella
and Hornung (2016), although the authors use the share of farms rather than the share of land. Note that the threshold for classifying as
a large estate in Prussia is quite distinct, and is likely to be much larger, than the collateral threshold required for bank loans 𝑞𝑇 in the
model.
30We use the territorial definitions of counties in 1900. In cases where county boundaries were redrawn, we extrapolate the population
shares backwards using the constituent territories’ growth rates, with the relative population shares as weights. This yields stable units
of observation over time.
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where 𝑘 is a linguistic or religious group. An alternative is a polarization index, as pro-
posed by Esteban et al. (2012), which may be more relevant when focusing on antagonism
between two groups, such as Germans and Poles.31 However, Esteban et al. (2012) empha-
size that polarization is a predictor of conflict over public, rather than private goods, and it
is the latter that we are primarily interested in. We therefore employ the fractionalization
index in most applications.
3.3.4 Banks and other controls
In our setting, controlling for bank presence is important because savings banks were the
main substitute to co-ops as sources of finance 19th Century Prussia. In line with our
conceptual framework, however, they did not generally target individual small farmers
either as savers or borrowers (Burhop, 2011; Born, 1985). Moreover, as they could supply
credit to cooperatives, they sometimes acted as complementary institutions. We use the
founding date of all savings banks present in the year 1909 (Evert, 1911) to construct a
panel of these institutions.
Most other county-level control variables are extracted from the aforementioned iPEH-
Database (Becker et al., 2014). A small number of variables (urbanization and soil quality)
are taken from Meitzen (1901). Tables B.1 and B.2 provide summary statistics and a short
description of all variables. The main variables of interest are also mapped in Appendix E.
3.4 Empirical strategy
3.4.1 Benchmark specification
Based on the comparative statics properties in Proposition 1, we know that a change in
grain prices should determine market entry by cooperatives, conditional on fixed county
characteristics. Our empirical benchmark specification explains the formation of credit
cooperatives at the county level from 1852, the year of the first foundation, to 1913, the
last year before World War I. Formally:
Δ𝐶𝑖(𝑗), 𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽1Δ𝑃
𝑟𝑒𝑙. 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛
𝑖, 𝑡 +𝛽2𝑁𝑖+𝛽3𝐻𝑖+𝛽4𝑞+𝛽5𝑞
2+𝛽6𝑞+𝑉𝑡+𝑊𝑖+𝛼𝑗+𝜖𝑖, 𝑡 (10)
where Δ𝐶𝑖(𝑗), 𝑡 is the growth in the number of credit cooperatives in county 𝑖 in year
𝑡. The main explanatory variables are those developed in our conceptual framework: 𝛽1
captures the role of grain price changes, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 examine the effect of population and
31See Cinirella and Schueler (2016), who make this point in a Prussian context specifically.
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population heterogeneity.32 𝛽4 investigates the effect of mean assets, measured by mean
farm size, and 𝛽5 takes account of the hypothesized hump-shaped relationship between
mean assets and cooperatives. Finally, 𝛽6 tests the association between asset inequality 𝑞
and co-op growth. In the benchmark specification, we include two further control variables
in 𝑊𝑖: urbanization (the share of a county’s population living in urban settlements), and
a dummy for "surburban" counties, which we define as those that encompass a town not
part of that county. In some specifications, we control for the number of banks per county
at the start of the panel.33
We always include three time varying dummies in 𝑉𝑡 that capture important policy
changes affecting the legal environment in which cooperatives could operate (Faust, 1965b).
These are the 1867 incorporation law bestowing legal personhood unto cooperatives, the
1889 law allowing co-ops to elect limited liability on members’ assets, and the 1895
founding of the Preussenkasse, a central public bank set up to extend loans to coopera-
tives experiencing short term liquidity crises.34 In some specifications, we also test for the
other time-varying factor from our model: annual bank interest rates 𝑟𝑏 from Bundesbank
(1976). We also test for the effect of GDP growth, which has been shown to affect the
growth of MFIs (Ahlin et al., 2011).
The dependent variable in equation 10 is a discrete non-negative count, and therefore
estimated using a Poisson (Cameron and Trivedi, 2015). In most specifications, we pool
data across counties and years, although we always employ fixed effects 𝛼𝑗 at level of the
14 districts. This is the administrative layer between our 6 provinces and 236 counties, and
groups together historically similar counties. We also estimate some models with county
or year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
3.4.2 Causal identification
To what extent will a regression of credit cooperatives on grain prices yield causal es-
timates? Our counties are too small to have influenced the German price level, so that
we can rule out reverse causality. However, third factors, such as large regional harvest
shocks, could have affected aggregate grain supply and hence prices. Such harvest shocks
could also directly drive credit demand. In this case 𝛽1 in equation 10 may not be picking
32Clearly, a higher rate of co-op formation is mechanically expected in larger counties, and 𝛽2 should not be interpreted as measuring
the impact of group size 𝑁𝑐 from the model.
33Although variables like population or banks could be allowed to vary over time, we prefer keep them fixed in most specifications
to mitigate their potential endogeneity to grain price shocks, which would lead to a "bad controls" problem.
34See Guinnane (2004) for a discussion of the actual role of the Preussenkasse and the middle-tier regional "central" banks. Econo-
metrically, these policy dummies account for the higher mean growth rate of co-ops after 1890 visible in Figure 1d.
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up the causal effect of prices on credit cooperatives.35 Ultimately, we are interested in
falling grain prices as a feature of structural transformation. These price changes were the
result of evolving domestic demand patterns and international integration. We therefore
make use of a theoretical result from the literature on structural transformation derived by
Teignier (2018): In a small, land scarce, and reasonably open economy, domestic relative
prices should be determined by (lower) world market prices for agricultural goods. The
resulting lower price ratio can drive structural change. As a grain producer Prussia, and
Germany in its entirety, were small relative to the land abundant producers in Argentina,
Russia, and the USA that were increasingly dominating German grain markets. Moreover,
as non-perishable staple grains were more easily tradeable than dairy or meat, import com-
petition was particularly severe for these goods (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2009). We there-
fore use US prices for wheat and rye (Jacks, 2013) as an instrument for German prices.
The US was one of the largest producers of staple grains in the world, which ensures the
instrument is relevant.36 Moreover, the exclusion restriction that US grain prices affect the
creation of local credit cooperatives only through its effect on German prices is likely to
hold given that US and local Prussian supply conditions are unlikely to be correlated.
We also exploit the international environment of 19th century globalization to identify
the causal effect of other macroeconomic variables. We instrument German bank interest
rates, which could conceivably be driven by competition from expanding credit cooper-
atives, by the Bank of England’s official discount rate. The Bank of England acted as
the "conductor" of the international monetary system of the 19th century, and national
central banks often followed its rate setting policy, transmitting its rates to domestic mar-
kets (Eichengreen, 1987). Figure C.5 shows the strong comovement between the Bank of
England and German commercial rates.
Similarly, as discussed by Ahlin et al. (2011), a regression of MFI outcomes on GDP
growth may not produce causal effects due to omitted variables. In our setting, one pos-
sibility may be that, as rural incomes are increasing, this increases GDP growth while at
the same time decreasing rural credit demand.37 We therefore instrument German GDP
growth with UK GDP growth, lagged one period. The UK was Europe’s largest economy
at the time, and Germany’s principal trade partner, making the instrument relevant. It also
seems unlikely that UK incomes of the past year were driven by current German demand
conditions.
35Specifically, if domestic grain supply is negatively related to gain prices and demand for credit, 𝛽1 would understate the true
negative effect of grain prices on credit cooperatives.
36Figure C.3 shows the degree to which US and German prices are indeed correlated. Note that what matters for our instrument is
not whether US and German price levels were the same (given trade costs and tariffs), but that the changes were closely correlated.
37This would imply that the coefficient would be biased towards 0, which is what we in fact observe in table 3 (columns (3) and (6)).
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A different strategy is required for cross-sectional variables, such as land inequality.
Here we exploit the unique history of settlement of the Prussian eastern provinces. Specif-
ically, we focus on the fact that these territories were settled by colonists from the High
Middle Ages onwards, and that there were, roughly, two motivations for settlement. One
was economic: farmers, craftsmen and merchants were drawn to the East because it offered
relatively sparsely populated land. The other was military: parts of the East were popu-
lated by pagan peoples, which drew a number of crusading military orders to the region,
the most notorious being the Teutonic Order (Herrman, 2015). These crusaders established
large landed estates centered around military strongholds on the land conquered from pa-
gan peoples. Although the crusading orders themselves had been abandoned by 1525, and
many of their strongholds were ruins by the 19th century, their settlements planted the
seed for the unequal land distribution in the region (Torbus, 1998). We therefore measure
the distance from each county capital to these historical military strongholds to arrive at
an instrument for land inequality.38 The instrument’s validity is predicated on the notion
in the historical literature that the location of these military settlements were driven by the
shifting security situation of the middle ages, rather than the economic considerations of
the 19th century (see Torbus (1998, p. 56-57), Leighton (2016) and Piana and Carlsson
(2014)).39
For other variables, we are not able to employ instrumental variables. Yet we do utilize
another key feature of our historical setting by exploiting the precedence in timing of our
covariates. For example, we can hold county-level ethno-linguistic heterogeneity or the
development of the banking system fixed at their 1852 values, before credit cooperatives
even existed. Although this does not completely rule out the possibility of "deep" county-
specific omitted variables, it does decrease their likelihood and rule out reverse causality.40
4 Results
4.1 Benchmark results
The main results in table 1 strongly support the predictions of our theoretical framework.
We commence in column (3) by showing the results of the full benchmark specification
38We use a historical atlas (Zeissig, 1964) to code the location of the principal strongholds. The atlas identifies 17 such settlements.
39We include soil quality to control for potential economic determinants of settlement, but this does not affect our estimates. Soil
quality is used as an instrument for land inequality by Cinirella and Hornung (2016) in their study of education. We do not use it for
this purpose, as soil quality will have affected rural cooperatives through influencing the local crop mix (see section 3.3.1.
40One important variable that we only observe mid-way in our sample period (1886) is farm size 𝑞. However, we also run our
benchmark regression solely on data after that year, and find that the coefficient on 𝑞 has not changed significantly compared to the
benchmark, thus suggesting that endogeneity of farm sizes to cooperative foundation is not a major confound (see column (4), table F.6).
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derived in section 3.4.1. The coefficient on grain prices is negative and strongly statisti-
cally significant, suggesting that falling relative grain prices played a role in the rise of
credit cooperatives in counties heavily reliant on grain production. Introducing year fixed
effects decreases the precision of the estimator, but the coefficient is left intact (column
(6)).
The coefficient on farm size is positive while its quadratic term is negative: high lev-
els of rural assets encourage the formation of credit cooperatives, but beyond a certain
threshold, asset wealth actually decreases cooperative growth. This is consistent with the
hypothesized hump-shaped relationship between private assets and small-scale credit aris-
ing from the presence of bank lending with collateral requirements. The coefficient on
land inequality is negative, showing that counties with a higher share of land held in large
estates provided a less hospitable environment for the growth of microfinance institutions.
The impact of linguistic fractionalization is as ambiguous empirically as it is in the-
ory. Although the coefficient is generally positive, in line with Proposition 2, it is only
statistically significant in column (2) before the introduction of urbanization controls. As
the coefficient on the urbanization variable shows, most credit cooperatives thrived in ru-
ral areas. These rural areas were also disproportionally fractionalized, accounting for the
strength of the positive correlation in (2).
As can be expected, population is a strong predictor of cooperative growth, but this
relationship is partly mechanical. Finally, the time-varying policy dummies indicate that
the institutional environment had a strong effect on co-op growth: the introduction of
limited liability laws, and the founding of the cooperative central bank seem to have played
a large role in encouraging credit cooperative formation.
The above results are robust to the introduction of a wider set of control variables, for
example the percentage of the workforce employed in manufacturing, and market poten-
tial in column (4).41 The variables themselves emphasize the idea that, conditional on
the distribution of private land assets, credit cooperatives were more likely to form in less
industrialized and more remote areas. In column (5) we also examine whether the ge-
ographical spread of the cooperative idea itself mattered (Jensen et al., 2018), but find
that credit cooperatives were no more likely to form if they were closer to Neuwied, the
location where Raiffeisen propagated his ideas.
We include more controls, including 1892 wage levels, labour income growth between
1880-1905, migration rates between 1895-1905, illiteracy, and population density in ta-
ble F.1, but do not include these in the main specifications as they may be affected by the
41Market potential is the distance from each county capital to all other German counties and foreign capitals, weighted by the size
(population) of these markets (Kopsidis and Wolf, 2012).
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Table 1: Determinants of credit cooperative growth, county level, Prussia: Benchmark
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No fixed
effects
No
urbanization Benchmark
Controlling
for trade &
industrialization
Controlling
for ideas
transmission
Year
fixed effects
Dependent Variable: Number of new credit cooperatives per county
Δ grain prices -41.6120*** -38.2984*** -38.3988*** -38.3154*** -38.3955*** -38.3075**
(3.2788) (3.0438) (3.0575) (3.0454) (3.0567) (13.4610)
limited liability 1.6035*** 1.5914*** 1.5920*** 1.5917*** 1.5920***
(0.1547) (0.1539) (0.1540) (0.1540) (0.1540)
central bank 1.3803*** 1.3892*** 1.3888*** 1.3891*** 1.3888***
(0.1419) (0.1410) (0.1411) (0.1412) (0.1411)
incorporation 0.0821 0.0664 0.0667 0.0663 0.0667
(0.1313) (0.1312) (0.1313) (0.1313) (0.1313)
population 0.0056*** 0.0060*** 0.0067*** 0.0080*** 0.0068*** 0.0068***
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013)
ling. fractionalisation 0.0442 0.4315** 0.1481 0.0503 0.1518 0.1528
(0.1730) (0.1640) (0.1523) (0.1419) (0.1532) (0.1518)
farm size 0.0925* 0.1956*** 0.1408*** 0.1289*** 0.1414*** 0.1406***
(0.0359) (0.0367) (0.0348) (0.0365) (0.0347) (0.0352)
farm size squared -0.0037** -0.0057*** -0.0039** -0.0036** -0.0039** -0.0039**
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
land inequality -0.4752* -0.9721*** -0.8487*** -0.8878*** -0.8632*** -0.8521***
(0.2391) (0.2189) (0.2019) (0.2008) (0.2122) (0.2009)
urbanization -1.3505*** -1.2294*** -1.3498*** -1.3493***
(0.2740) (0.2581) (0.2741) (0.2740)
suburbs -0.1205 -0.0615 -0.1204 -0.1210
(0.1184) (0.1109) (0.1183) (0.1186)
industrial employment -1.0096+
(0.5608)
market potential -0.5397*
(0.2288)
Raiffeisen distance 0.0105
(0.0505)
District F.E. X X X X X
Year F.E. X
Observations 14632 14632 14632 14632 14632 14632
No. of cooperatives 4941 4941 4941 4941 4941 4941
Sample: Six eastern provinces of Prussia, 1852-1913. Dep. Var. year-on-year change in number of credit cooperatives per county; grain
prices refers to the year-on-year change of the moving average of weighted rye and wheat prices lagged over the past five years, deflated
by the consumer price index. Limited liability, central bank and incorporation are time varying policy dummies. Other variables are time
invariant. See tables B.1 and B.2 in the appendix for further definitions. Poisson model with standard errors clustered at county level
(236 counties). Fixed effects at the level of 14 districts. All regressions exclude Berlin.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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price shocks themselves. These variables are not time varying, but we get similar results
when allowing population to vary over time in column (5) of the same table. Column
(6) in table F.1 fixes population and fractionalization at their 1852 values. This precludes
simultaneity bias, although it may also increase measurement error. Nonetheless, the con-
clusions of the benchmark regression carry through despite these alterations.
We will now investigate the mechanism behind each of our main variables, and inves-
tigate their causal effects.
4.2 Inequality
The benchmark regression uses the share of land in large estates as a measure for land
inequality, reflecting the focus in our theoretical framework on the share of top assets 𝑞. In
column (1) of table 2, we extend this definition to include the top two land size categories,
with little difference to the results. In column (2) we depart from this approach by taking
the whole land distribution of a county into account through a Gini-coefficient. The results
are statistically slightly weaker, but still indicate a negative effect of land inequality on
rural financialization at conventional significance levels.42
However, an important concern could be that our measures of land inequality pick up
omitted variables correlated with both land holdings and rural credit. For example, county-
level natural endowments, including soil quality, could conceivably affect both measures.
As a first step, we check whether our measure behaves in line with the historical evidence
on land inequality (Eddie, 2008). We know from existing work that even though land in-
equality itself was not necessarily decreasing during the 19th century, its effect diminished
as peasants were gradually freed from their manorial obligations and acquired full own-
ership rights over plots (Cinirella and Hornung, 2016). Our findings are in line with this
interpretation: Once we interact land inequality with a decadal time trend in column (3),
we find that the effect of inequality on credit cooperatives does indeed diminish over time,
although we cannot rule out attenuation bias here.
Although evidence from time trends makes it less likely that our findings are con-
founded by county characteristics, the effect of such confounders could conceivably be
time-varying too. We therefore utilize distance to medieval military settlements as an in-
strument for the share of land under large estates as described in section 3.4.2. Column (4)
demonstrates that after instrumentation, the coefficient on inequality remains significant
42We also excluded land inequality or farm size squared from the regression, but found that it left the main effect of farm sizes
qualitatively similar. Reversely, we experimented with dropping all land-related variables and instead included all bins of land size
save one in the regression. This too produced the predicted hump-shaped relationship between asset size categories and cooperative
foundation.
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Table 2: Determinants of credit cooperative growth, county level, Prussia: Land inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Top two
land inequality
Gini land
inequality
Gini with
decade effects
Instrumenting
land inequality
Instrument &
soil quality
Instrument &
public goods
Instrument &
state funding
Dependent Variable: Number of new credit cooperatives per county
Δ grain prices -38.4079*** -38.4126*** -29.4269*** -38.3059*** -38.3129*** -38.2945*** -38.5345***
(3.0645) (3.0714) (2.9270) (3.0319) (3.0340) (3.0357) (3.0323)
population 0.0067*** 0.0068*** 0.0068*** 0.0062*** 0.0062*** 0.0063*** 0.0045**
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
ling. fractionalisation 0.0926 0.0781 0.0826 0.4646** 0.4850** 0.3864* 0.3238*
(0.1548) (0.1536) (0.1537) (0.1793) (0.1762) (0.1698) (0.1571)
farm size 0.1361*** 0.1253*** 0.1276*** 0.2094*** 0.2034*** 0.2075*** 0.1072**
(0.0346) (0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0451) (0.0431) (0.0434) (0.0355)
farm size squared -0.0037** -0.0036** -0.0037** -0.0059*** -0.0058*** -0.0058*** -0.0032**
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0011)
land inequality -0.7688** -1.3200* -1.1674* -1.2606* -0.9868*
(0.2348) (0.6496) (0.5729) (0.6046) (0.4948)
Gini -1.2476*
(0.4960)
-1854 × Gini -7.8558***
(1.7538)
1855-1864 × Gini -3.3025**
(1.1036)
1865-1874 × Gini -3.0109**
(1.0923)
1875-1884 × Gini -4.3488***
(1.1016)
1885-1894 × Gini -3.9138***
(0.8789)
1895-1904 × Gini -0.5905
(0.5375)
1905-1913 × Gini -1.1339*
(0.5480)
Berlin distance 0.0504
(0.0694)
soil quality 0.1195
(0.1513)
pupil-teacher ratio 0.0055
(0.0042)
state public spending 0.1441
(0.1760)
District F.E. X X X X X X X
Urbanization controls X X X X
Policy dummies X X X X X X X
Observations 14632 14632 14632 14632 14632 14632 14632
No. of cooperatives 4941 4941 4941 4941 4941 4941 4941
Sample: Six eastern provinces of Prussia, 1852-1913. Dep. Var. year-on-year change in number of credit cooperatives per county; grain prices
refers to the year-on-year change of the moving average of weighted rye and wheat prices lagged over the past five years, deflated by the
consumer price index. Policy dummies refers to time varying dummies capturing reform of limited liability, central bank and incorporation law.
Other variables are time invariant. Urbanization controls include the share of the population resident in urban areas and a dummy for suburban
counties. Specifications (4)-(7) instrument land inequality (share of large estates) with distance to medieval military settlements. See tables B.1
and B.2 in the appendix for further definitions. (1), (2) & (3) Poisson, (4)-(7) GMM. Standard errors clustered at county level (236 counties).
Fixed effects at the level of 14 districts. All regressions exclude Berlin.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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and negative.43 As the location of these settlements was dictated by the military situation
facing medieval crusaders, rather than the agricultural conditions prevailing six centuries
later, the estimate should now be free from omitted confounders.44 Moreover, column (5)
shows that the instrument is not affected by controlling for soil quality directly.
Although the instrument strengthens the argument that land inequality affects credit
cooperatives, it does not pin down a mechanism. While the model emphasizes the impact
of land inequality through the distribution of bankable assets, other explanations are plau-
sible. Large landowners could have underprovided public goods such as education, thus
hampering co-op growth. They could also have used their political power to stymie the
growth of new credit institutions (Rajan and Ramcharan, 2011). Although it is difficult
to conclusively rule out these mechanisms, we are able to provide suggestive evidence
against them. In column (6) we control for the pupil-teacher ratio as a proxy for edu-
cational provision. In column (7) we control for the share of school funding that comes
from the state, rather than other (local) sources. This proxies the degree to which large
landowners may have substituted for state organs, and thus gauges their political power.
In both cases, we find the coefficient on land inequality unaffected.
4.3 Rural transformation
According to our conceptual framework, a decline in staple prices encourages farmers to
found microfinance institutions. These institutions allow credit-constrained producers to
enter the production of capital-intensive agricultural goods, driving rural transformation.
In this section, we show that the empirical evidence strongly supports the causal impact
of relative grain prices on the formation of credit cooperatives. There is also suggestive
evidence that these cooperatives aided rural transformation.
We first examine the effect of relative grain price changes in a setting with county fixed
effects in column (1) of table 3. The coefficient on grain prices is virtually unchanged
from the benchmark regression.45 However, German grain prices could be endogenous
to domestic supply conditions. Using US grain prices as an instrument in (4) takes care
43Similarly, the reduced form relationship (columns (6) and (7) in table F.4) shows that distance to medieval settlements predicts
co-op formation six centuries later. Note that we do not include urbanization controls in most of the instrumental variable regressions
concerning inequality, as patterns of urbanization will have been historically determined by the instrument itself.
44One common problem with geographical instruments is that the distance to a single point could be correlated with unobserved
spatial variables. In this case, however, we use the sum of distances to 17 settlements, making such coincidental correlation unlikely
as long as the initial allocation of settlements is as good as random. Consequently, our instrument is robust to the inclusion of other
distance-based measures.
45We use the Poisson conditional fixed effect model with the robust sandwich error estimator proposed by Hausman et al. (1984),
which has the benefit of being robust to a misspecification of the underlying count distribution, serial correlation, as well as time-
invariant spatial dependence (Bertanha and Moser, 2016). We loose observations from two counties with zero co-op growth, and from
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Table 3: Determinants of credit cooperative growth, county level, Prussia: Prices and other time varying
variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Prices,
county
fixed
effects
Controlling
for bank
interest
rates
Controlling
for GDP
growth
Instrumenting
with US
prices
Instrumenting
with UK
interest
rates
Instrumenting
with UK
growth
rates
Controlling
for
price
volatility
Dependent Variable: Number of new credit cooperatives per county
Δ grain prices -37.21*** -35.30*** -37.99*** -46.74*** -33.96*** -33.35*** -32.30***
(3.16) (3.38) (3.02) (4.87) (3.33) (3.54) (2.86)
limited liability 1.58*** 1.87*** 1.59*** 1.65*** 1.85*** 1.77*** 1.59***
(0.15) (0.22) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.26) (0.15)
central bank 1.39*** 1.63*** 1.39*** 1.35*** 1.68*** 1.42*** 1.48***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
incorporation -0.12 0.06 -0.03 0.028 0.32*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
interest rates -0.28*** -0.34***
(0.033) (0.040)
GDP growth 0.0112 0.3404*
(0.0133) (0.1410)
population 0.0067*** 0.0064*** 0.0067***
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013)
ling. frac. 0.1268 0.2043 0.1332
(0.1515) (0.1604) (0.1517)
farm size 0.1345*** 0.1341*** 0.1394***
(0.0339) (0.0348) (0.0340)
farm size sq. -0.0037** -0.0035** -0.0038**
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012)
land inequality -0.8173*** -0.9006*** -0.8145***
(0.2013) (0.2121) (0.2017)
price volatility 8.07***
(1.66)
District F.E. X X X
County F.E. X X X X
Urbanization controls X X X
Observations 13572 8740 14508 13572 8740 14508 14508
No. of cooperatives 4940 4591 4941 4940 4714 4591 4941
Sample: Six eastern provinces of Prussia, 1852-1913. Dep. Var.: year-on-year change in number of credit cooperatives per county;
grain prices refers to the year-on-year change of the moving average of weighted rye and wheat prices lagged over the past five years,
deflated by the consumer price index. Price volatility is the five year standard deviation of the change in deflated rye and week prices.
Limited liability, central bank and incorporation are time varying policy dummies. GDP growth is annual change in German GDP,
interest rate is the lending rate of German commercial banks (available from 1876). Other variables are time invariant. Urbanization
controls include the share of the population resident in urban areas and a dummy for suburban counties. See tables B.1 and B.2
in the appendix for further definitions. Specification (3) instruments relative grain prices using US prices (available from 1856), (4)
instruments interest rates using the UK Bank of England discount rate, (5) instruments GDP growth with UK GDP growth lagged by 1
year. Specifications (1), (2), (3), (7) are county fixed effects Poisson regressions (234 counties). (4), (5) and (6) are GMM with fixed
effects at the level of 14 districts. Standard errors clustered at county level (236 counties). All regressions exclude Berlin.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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of this concern. Movements in US prices impacted German grain price changes, and this
encouraged farmers in those counties of Prussia heavily reliant on grain production to set
up credit cooperatives. The coefficient on grain prices increases, suggesting that domestic
harvest shocks affecting prices and credit demand simultaneously biased the coefficient to-
wards zero.46 We obtain similar conclusions in the reduced form (column (2) in table F.4),
as well as when instrumenting rye and wheat cultivation with exogenous variation in soil
quality (column (5) in table F.3). Theoretically, trade policy could have affected the pace
of financial development in rural areas by shielding domestic grain producers. In column
(5) and (6) of table F.6 we separately consider the years before and after Germany’s land-
mark 1879 tariffs (Lehmann, 2010). Yet we find the direct effect of US grain prices to
be higher in the decades after the tariffs, suggesting technology-driven market integration
outpaced policy markers.
In the model, bank lending rates act as a floor for cooperative lending rates. High
bank interest rates will therefore negatively impact the formation of credit unions. This
assertion finds support in column (2) in table 3, where the annual mean interest rates of
German commercial banks is shown to be negatively correlated with the co-op growth
rate. Exploiting exogenous interest rate shocks from the Bank of England, the results in
column (5) suggest that this relationship is causal: increases in the discount rate in the
UK changed the lending practices of German banks, which decreased the attractiveness of
setting up credit cooperatives.
Although not explicitly a part of our model, we also investigate the role of the GDP
growth rate on microcredit, as rising incomes are intimately related to structural transfor-
mation (column (3)). In column (6), we instrument German GDP growth with lagged UK
GDP growth, and find there to be a statistically significant impact on co-op formation. This
supports the conclusions Ahlin et al. (2011) draw from correlational evidence on modern
data. We interpret this result as being related to structural transformation: an exogenous
increase in German per capita incomes shifts relative demand away from staples. With
prices fixed by world markets, this implies a smaller output share for staples, increasing
the demand for loans to aid exiting that sector. This is supported by the observation that
the coefficient on GDP growth is not different from 0 if we ignore endogeneity in column
(3): domestic German GDP growth partially reflects increasing farm incomes, and this
decreases credit demand.
four years without US price data. We obtain similar results in a specification allowing for both county and year fixed effects (column
(1) in table F.3).
46Incidental parameters imply that we cannot use county fixed effects in this GMM set-up, so that the IV results are comparable to
the benchmark in column (3), table 1 rather than the fixed effects specification.
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Table 4: Determinants of cooperative growth, county level, Prussia: Savings banks and other cooperatives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Explaining
production
cooperatives
production
co-ops with fixed
credit co-ops
Credit
cooperatives
with banks
Controlling for
bank
growth
Controlling
for lagged
cooperatives
Placebo:
other
cooperatives
Dependent Variable: New production co-ops per county New credit cooperatives per county Other co-ops
Δ credit cooperatives 0.2186***
(0.0197)
credit cooperatives 1873 0.0981*
(0.0476)
lag credit cooperatives -0.0119***
(0.0034)
Δ grain prices -38.4872*** -37.1641*** -34.0767*** 6.7631+
(3.0761) (3.1637) (3.1267) (3.6497)
limited liability 1.5923*** 1.5840*** 1.5759*** 2.7979***
(0.1539) (0.1534) (0.1532) (0.2047)
central bank 1.3887*** 1.4876*** 1.5582*** 1.2151***
(0.1411) (0.1403) (0.1430) (0.1130)
incorporation 0.0671 -0.1431 -0.0092
(0.1313) (0.1361) (0.1322)
population 0.0077*** 0.0076*** 0.0068*** 0.0053**
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0019)
ling. fractionalisation 0.1822 0.0988 0.3132+ -0.5203
(0.1579) (0.1640) (0.1818) (0.3702)
farm size 0.1353*** 0.1402*** 0.1568*** 0.3012***
(0.0338) (0.0359) (0.0383) (0.0677)
farm size squared -0.0037** -0.0038** -0.0043** -0.0078***
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0021)
land inequality -0.7830*** -0.8917*** -0.9641*** -0.6886
(0.2049) (0.2161) (0.2619) (0.6314)
banks, 1852 0.1379** 0.1524** 0.1773*** 0.1103
(0.0477) (0.0504) (0.0504) (0.1046)
Δ banks -0.0065
(0.0562)
income growth -0.0010 -0.0013
(0.0020) (0.0021)
market potential -0.4298* -0.5100**
(0.2003) (0.1847)
soil quality 0.0193 0.0573
(0.1372) (0.1433)
population, 1870 0.0001+
(0.0000)
County F.E. X
District F.E. X X X X X
Urbanization controls X X X X X
Observations 11781 9912 14632 12508 14396 14632
No. of cooperatives 898 898 4941 4375 4940 2000
Sample: Six eastern provinces of Prussia, 1873-1913 in (1) - (2);1852-1913 in (3), (5) & (6), 1852-1909 in (4). Dep. Var. for
specifications (1) - (2): year-on-year change in number of production cooperatives per county; (3), (4) and (5): year-on-year change
in number of credit cooperatives per county, (6): year-on-year change in number of other cooperatives per county. Banks refers to
the time-varying number of banks per county, available before 1909 only, except banks 1852, which refers to the count of banks at
that date. See tables B.1 and B.2 in the appendix for further definitions. All specifications are Poisson. Standard errors clustered at
county level (236 counties). Fixed effects at the level of 14 districts. All regressions exclude Berlin.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.00128
Although the effect of grain prices on credit cooperatives is robust, there are alterna-
tive interpretations of this relationship that do not draw on structural change. Rather than
exiting grain production, farmers could have accessed credit to smooth consumption or in-
sure against risk (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007). Although cooperatives did mainly extend
loans for productive purposes rather than for consumption or debt refinancing, this rule
was not always followed (Guinnane, 2001). We therefore include grain price volatility as
a covariate in column (7) in table 3.47 The coefficient on price volatility has a positive
sign and is statistically significant, suggesting that price volatility is an alternative channel
leading to the development of rural credit markets. However, the results for grain prices
remain largely unaffected. Even more, the effect of price volatility is economically small
(section 4.6), and price volatility was generally declining as market integration proceeded
(figure C.4).
In table 4 we provide additional indirect evidence on the role of credit cooperatives in
helping farmers to exit staple production. Because annual data on changes in agricultural
output at the county level is lacking, we use the founding of production cooperatives as
a proxy for annual changes in rural production. These cooperatives produced income
elastic goods such as dairy and meat. Column (1) shows that a higher growth rate of
credit cooperatives is indeed associated with a contemporaneous increase in the foundation
of production cooperatives. Although this regression controls for county-fixed effects, it
could still be that time varying omitted factors drive both growth rates. In column (2),
we rule this out by fixing the number of credit cooperatives at the 1873 value, the year in
which the first production cooperative was founded (see figure 1d).
In table 5, we turn to direct evidence for rural transformation by regressing the change
in livestock numbers between 1868 and 1906 on the growth in credit cooperatives during
this period at the county level. The correlation is statistically strong and economically
meaningful for all three livestock categories: dairy cattle, beef cattle, and pigs.48 One
additional cooperative is associated with 130 additional heads of dairy cattle during this
period, and with more than 400 pigs. The results are robust to controlling for a range
of covariates, including 1868 livestock levels, as well as urbanization levels and income
and population growth. Although these particular results are suggestive rather than causal,
they do lend support to the interpretation that credit cooperatives helped grain producing
regions to diversify farm output and switch to more capital-intensive production.49
47The variable is calculated as the standard deviation of changes in our relative grain price index over the past five years.
48Data on livestock numbers stems from the Prussian cattle censuses (Meitzen, 1901; Preußisches Statistisches Landesamt, 1908).
We calculate beef cattle as total cattle subtracting cows and calves.
49We find, on the contrary, little evidence that credit cooperatives are associated with stalling structural transformation in the wider
economy, for example by hindering emigration or industrial employment in counties where they were active.
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Table 5: Non-grain rural production, county level, Prussia: Change in livestock 1868-1906
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dairy
cattle
Beef
cattle Pigs
Dairy cattle,
controls
Beef cattle,
controls
Pigs,
controls
Dependent Variable: Δ livestock headcount 1868-1906
Δ Credit cooperatives 1868-1906 131.14* 297.51*** 474.8*** 131.2** 266.7*** 416.9***
(51.5) (54.0) (77.8) (42.9) (47.9) (71.5)
dairy cattle, 1868 -0.013 -0.115
(0.113) (0.132)
beef cattle, 1868 -0.546** -0.616***
(0.171) (0.166)
pigs, 1868 0.991*** 0.865***
(0.187) (0.196)
population growth -532.2+ -1217.1* -689.7
(274.4) (495.9) (463.9)
income growth per capita -13.25 -34.42* 4.32
(12.6) (15.9) (42.9)
District F.E. X X X X X X
Urbanization controls X X X
Observations 236 236 236 236 236 236
R-squared 0.446 0.426 0.596 0.513 0.482 0.618
Sample: Six eastern provinces of Prussia 1868-1906. Dep. Var. total change in headcount of lifestock (dairy cattle,
beef cattle, pigs) per county over the entire period. Urbanization controls include the share of the population resident
in urban areas and a dummy for suburban counties; See tables B.1 and B.2 for further definitions. All regressions are
OLS with fixed effects at the level of 14 districts with robust standard errors. All regressions exclude Berlin.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
How does the availability of other financial institutions impact the development of
small-scale credit? In our theoretical framework, banks and microcredit institutions serve
segmented markets of individual lenders due to the presence of collateral requirements.
For borrowers at the threshold, one would expect banks credit and micro credit to be sub-
stitutes (Cull et al., 2014; Colvin and McLaughlin, 2014). However, individuals founded
cooperatives partly to access bank loans as a group, in which case both institutions would
exercise complementary roles (Ahlin et al., 2011; Périlleux et al., 2016). If the latter is
true, one might also be concerned that our count of cooperatives simply captures regional
financial development. The results in column (3) of table 4 show that this concern is un-
substantiated: controlling for the number of banks at the county level at the start of the
sample does not affect the other coefficients. The coefficient on the number of banks does
support the interpretation of complementarity, although it cannot be ruled out that omitted
variables at the county level affect the creation of both institutions. Similarly, control-
ling for growth in the number of banks in column (4) does not change these conclusions,
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and the results continue to show that small scale credit was still more likely to develop in
counties where banks were present early on.
The market entry of a credit cooperative may also be conditional on the existence of
other credit cooperatives. The presence of existing cooperatives could encourage the for-
mation of new cooperatives through through learning and demonstration effects, or make
market entry less attractive through competition and market saturation effects. To this
end, column (5) includes the stock of cooperatives, lagged one period, as a regressor. The
coefficient is negative and statistically significant, suggesting the presence of saturation
effects. The other coefficients are largely unchanged.50
Finally, we might be concerned that our results are driven by factors that determine
cooperative activity over time more generally, but that have nothing to do with credit co-
operatives per se. This we investigate with a placebo test in column (6), where we regress
the change in the number of all non-credit cooperatives on our benchmark variables.51
Grain prices are, if anything, positively related to the growth of these other cooperatives,
which may reflect income effects. Banks are now no longer statistically significant.
4.4 Ethno-linguistic heterogeneity
Our conceptual framework showed that heterogeneity among the population could hinder
the appearance of rural small scale credit by imposing high costs on transactions between
group members (equation 6). On the other hand, per Proposition 2, these costs can also
provide an incentive to create a larger number of ethnically segregated cooperatives. There
is indeed historiographical evidence that credit cooperatives in Prussia’s eastern provinces
became heavily segregated in the last decades of the 19th century (Lorenz and Müller,
2006). However, the benchmark results did not support a strong role for ethno-linguistic
fractionalization in affecting cooperative growth. Column (1) of table 6 shows that the
same is true for religious fractionalization. Although the coefficient now has a negative
sign, it is still not statistically significant. This does not change when we use polariza-
tion measures in column (2). We cannot attribute these results to the endogeneity of the
population distribution to price shocks or cooperative growth itself (column (6), table F.1).
However, the effect of fractionalization could be obscured, if ethno-linguistic or con-
fessional groups differ by characteristics that are relevant to founding or operating MFIs.
50Splitting the sample at the spike in the year 1894 reveals that the saturation effect is only present in later years, whereas the
coefficient on lagged stocks in earlier years is positive and thus consistent with demonstration effects. We also included the lagged
growth of cooperatives as regressors in an AR(5) and AR(10) model, but this similarly left the coefficients on prices and the cross-
sectional variables of interest unaltered.
51Other cooperatives include production, consumption, and resource cooperatives. The latter two were mainly concerned with
attaining monopsony power in purchasing consumption goods or raw materials.
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Table 6: Determinants of credit cooperative growth, county level, Prussia: Ethno-linguistic heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Religious
fractionalization
Linguistic
polarization
Share of
Polish speakers
Share of
Protestants
Inequality
interaction
Ethnic
inequality
Dependent Variable: Number of new credit cooperatives per county
Δ grain prices -38.4109*** -38.4040*** -38.3615*** -38.4115*** -38.4364*** -38.4159***
(3.0575) (3.0580) (3.0464) (3.0583) (3.0635) (3.0509)
population 0.0069*** 0.0068*** 0.0067*** 0.0069*** 0.0067*** 0.0066***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
ling. fractionalisation 0.3259+ -0.2814 0.1686
(0.1682) (0.4115) (0.1540)
farm size 0.1422*** 0.1403*** 0.1327*** 0.1422*** 0.1361*** 0.1387***
(0.0345) (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0343) (0.0345) (0.0348)
farm size sq -0.0039** -0.0039** -0.0037** -0.0039** -0.0037** -0.0038**
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013)
land inequality -0.8495*** -0.8465*** -0.7204*** -0.8511*** -1.0044*** -0.8324***
(0.2003) (0.2019) (0.2163) (0.2005) (0.2809) (0.2045)
rel. fractionalisation -0.2082 -0.2106
(0.2789) (0.2740)
ling. polarization 0.0746
(0.0805)
Polish share -0.2996*
(0.1345)
Protestant share 0.0049
(0.1623)
ling. frac. × land inequality 1.0399
(0.9815)
religious inequality 0.4579
(0.4674)
District F.E. X X X X X X
Urbanization controls X X X X X X
Policy dummies X X X X X X
Observations 14632 14632 14632 14632 14632 14632
No. of cooperatives 4941 4941 4941 4941 4941 4941
Sample: Six eastern provinces of Prussia, 1852-1913. Dep. Var. year-on-year change in number of credit cooperatives per county;
grain prices refers to the year-on-year change of the moving average of weighted rye and wheat prices lagged over the past five years,
deflated by the consumer price index. Policy dummies refers to time varying dummies capturing reform of limited liability, central
bank and incorporation law. Other variables are time invariant. Urbanization controls include the share of the population resident in
urban areas and a dummy for suburban counties. See tables B.1 and B.2 in the appendix for further definitions. All specifications are
Poisson. Standard errors clustered at county level (236 counties). Fixed effects at the level of 14 districts. All regressions exclude
Berlin.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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For example, an influential literature accords higher human capital formation (Becker and
Wößmann, 2009) or entrepreneurial productivity (Hornung, 2014) to Protestants in Prus-
sia. Moreover, ethnic Poles were likely to have received less education than Germans, as
ethnically Polish areas received less funding from the Prussian government (Cinirella and
Schueler, 2016). In this case, our fractionalization indices could be capturing the effect of
moving along the population’s skill distribution. In column (3) and (4) we therefore control
for the share of Polish speakers and Protestants respectively. In the first case, the positive
coefficient on linguistic fractionalization becomes marginally significant. The sign on the
share of Polish speakers shows that Polish areas were indeed somewhat less likely to see
credit cooperatives develop.
It could also be that ethnic heterogeneity only matters if it is correlated with economic
inequality (Alesina et al., 2016). For example, O’Rourke (2007, p. 1375) shows for Irish
cooperatives that it is "this coincidence between religious, national and class divisions
within Ireland that was crucial for the slow spread of cooperation". On the other hand, in
the context of the model in section 2, if the wealthy resort to bank loans, and wealth and
ethnicity overlap, the remaining cooperative group could be more homogenous. This could
actually lower their internal transaction costs. We tackle these possibilities by interacting
linguistic fractionalization and land inequality in column (5) as well as calculating our
own measure of religious inequality in column (6).52 However, neither measure yields
significant results. Importantly, none of the other coefficients in the model are affected,
including our baseline measure of land inequality. We therefore conclude that there is no
consistent role for population heterogeneity in our results.
4.5 Cooperative characteristics and further robustness
Until this point, we have pooled all credit cooperatives in our data set. However, our data
does allow us to differentiate cooperatives according to their characteristics, in particular
the liability structure and deposit requirements adopted at the end of the sample. We first
exclude all cooperatives in counties with an urban population above the median in column
(1) of table F.5. We do this as urban cooperatives often followed the organizational model
of Schulze-Delitzsch rather than the Raiffeisen model, which dominated in rural areas.
However, we do not find that this changes the results. Similarly, we do not find in column
(2) that only including cooperatives that had opted for unlimited joint liability by 1913
52We measure the extent to which members of either the Protestant or Catholic confession are overrepresented among land-holding
farmers in a county. Data is from the 1882 Prussian occupational census. For groups 𝐴,𝐵 in county 𝑖:
𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 =
⃒⃒⃒
𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠𝐴, 𝑖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐴, 𝑖
− 𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠𝐵, 𝑖
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝐵, 𝑖
⃒⃒⃒
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affects our conclusions.53 The subset of unlimited liability cooperatives can be further
decomposed according to the minimum capital contribution required by the cooperative.
Reassuringly, we find cooperatives requiring "large" contributions (above 100 Mark) in
column (4) to be more affected by the distribution of assets in their county than those at
or below this threshold in column (3).54 The role of price shocks is apparent for both
categories.
One remaining concern could be that our results are driven by a few instances of par-
ticularly drastic price changes. One episode that stands out in figure 1c is the rapid fall
in grain prices in the early 1890s, which preceded a large growth episode for credit co-
operatives. In column (2) of table F.6 we check whether excluding this spike affects our
conclusions. Although the coefficient on grain prices turns out to be smaller, we conclude
that this episode alone does not drive our story. A related worry could be that this large
price shock acted as a structural break, fundamentally altering the relationship between our
variables. Yet inspecting columns (3) and (4) does not suggest that significant differences
exist before and after the shock, although the effect of land inequality is weaker after the
1890s as noted in section 4.2.
We also check whether our benchmark results are robust to changes in the cross-
sectional sample composition. Table F.7 follows a Jackknife approach and drops all ob-
servations from one of our six provinces in turn. The stability of the coefficients show that
our results are unlikely to be driven by outliers.
Finally, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to changes in the econometric spec-
ification. Three issues in particular are important. Firstly, one might worry about the
large proportion of zero-outcomes in our data. Our Poisson model pooled the zero and
non-zero outcomes, while the data generating process for both could be different. One
common remedy are zero-inflated models, which allow both processes to differ (Cameron
and Trivedi, 2013). We implement these models in column (1) and (2) of table F.8, but
do not find that it affects our conclusions. Secondly, we relax our assumption that co-
op growth follows a Poisson distribution. Columns (3) and (4) implement a regular and
zero-inflated Negative Binomial model respectively. Once again, this does not change our
results. Thirdly, we regress our count variable on the natural logarithms of all independent
variables in column (5) using Ordinary Least Squares. In column (6), we do the same
for the logarithmic transformation of the co-op growth rate. Although these are not our
53The principle of unlimited liability was largely followed by Raiffeisen cooperatives, and was one of the main distinguishing features
of that organisational model.
54100 Mark was equal to roughly 50 days of work at 1913 average wages.
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specifications of choice, as they ignore the count nature of the data, it is reassuring that
our conclusions do not depend on specific functional forms.
4.6 Model fit, economic significance and counterfactual analysis
The previous sections have been mainly concerned with investigating the extent to which
the data supported the predictions of our theoretical framework. Now we turn to economic
significance: to what degree have we actually explained the rise of credit cooperatives?
Our first concern is model fit over time. Figure 3a plots the data on aggregate growth of
cooperatives (dashed line) against the aggregate annual predicted values from the bench-
mark specification (red solid line). This solid line only reflects price changes and policy
dummies. The prediction tracks the data quite closely. Clearly, the policy dummies ac-
count for the level differences after the 1890s, highlighting the importance of the institu-
tional environment for small scale credit. Still, the grain price variable is able to replicate
many turning points in the data. Would including more time-varying determinants fur-
ther improve model fit? The third line in panel 3a plots the benchmark specification after
the inclusion of price volatility. However, price volatility does not add much explanatory
power. In panel 3b we substitute price volatility for interest rates, which creates a very
good model fit. We conclude that we are able to largely explain the development of rural
microcredit with reference to only prices and interest rates.
Figure 3: Model fit over time
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(a) Data outcome and model fit with price volatility
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(b) Data outcome and model fit with interest rates
Our price variable consists of the interaction between temporal price changes and local
land use structure. How important is local variation in land use in determining the final
number of cooperatives? In figure 4a we plot the rapid increase in the cumulative num-
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ber of cooperatives for the counties in the highest quartile of the distribution for both rye
and wheat cultivation. This is in contrast to the sluggish evolution of co-ops in low-grain
countries. This descriptive evidence suggests that differences in cross-sectional reliance
on grain may be an important determinant of the final number of cooperatives. Figure 4b
engages in a counterfactual experiment by setting local rye and wheat shares to the first
percentile in their respective distributions. The counterfactual evolution of cooperatives
is slower than the benchmark model prediction, although cross-sectionally induced differ-
ences seem relatively small compared to high average growth rates over time.
Figure 4: Role of rye and wheat cultivation for cumulative growth of cooperatives: Descriptive statistics and
counterfactual
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Having established the explanatory power of our model over time, our next interest is
the relative importance of individual variables. In table 7 we list all statistically signifi-
cant coefficients from our benchmark specification. The coefficients are converted into a
count data equivalent of standardized 𝛽-coefficients (last column).55 Grain price move-
ments clearly had a large impact: One standard deviation increase in relative grain prices
decreases the growth rates of credit cooperatives by a factor of 0.66. Asset size plays a
large role too- a one standard deviation sized increase in farm sizes almost doubles co-op
growth. The role of population is more muted, and the increase in the co-op growth rate to
an increase in population is underproportional. Similarly, asset inequality seems to have
exercised a modest influence. However, this could partially be attributed to the relatively
limited variation in inequality in our sample. To examine this, we turn to counterfactual
simulations.
55𝛽𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 shows the factor change in the co-op growth rate as a response to a change in the independent variable. A value close
to 1 thus signifies a small effect.
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Table 7: Economic significance: Factor change in growth rate of credit cooperatives after one
standard deviation change in independent variables (last column)
Variable
Coefficient
(𝛽𝑥)
Incidence Rate Ratio
(IRR)
Standard deviation
of independent variable
𝜎𝑥 𝛽𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑
∆ grain prices -38.399 2.107E-17 0.011 0.66
Population 0.007 1.007 32.74 1.25
farm size 0.141 1.151 4.81 1.97
farm size squared -0.004 0.996 133.61 0.59
land inequality -0.849 0.428 0.172 0.86
urbanization -1.351 0.259 0.211 0.75
limited liability 1.592 4.914 (dummy) (dummy)
central bank 1.389 4.010 (dummy) (dummy)
coefficient (𝛽𝑥): as displayed in the benchmark regression (3), table 1
IRR: Factor change in co-op growth after 1 unit change in independent variable (exp(𝛽𝑥))
𝛽𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑: Factor change in co-op growth after 1 std. dev. change in independent variable (exp(𝛽𝑥 *𝜎𝑥))
Graph 5a plots the final number of credit cooperatives in 1913 for all of our 14 dis-
tricts.56 By virtue of the district fixed effects, this is equal to the predicted values of the
benchmark regression by district (not shown). The first counterfactual consists of setting
the fixed effects to 0, and shows that a large share of the variation is explained by the
remaining covariates.
Given the relatively limited variation in inequality in the sample, we need to consider
a "radical" policy experiment to see the effect of changes in this variable. In graph 5b,
we set land inequality to the level prevailing in the western provinces of Prussia, which is
on average 2 standard deviations lower than our sample mean. This leads to a non-trivial
counterfactual change in the number of credit cooperatives. In particular the most unequal
districts (comprising the province of Posen, see table D.1) would have seen a 50% increase
in the number of micro credit institutions.
We have shown asset size to be both statistically and economically highly significant.
However, the direction of the economic effects is hump-shaped. We illustrate this using a
"moderate" and a "radical" policy experiment. Both experiments rely on the distribution of
assets within the county (inequality) remaining unchanged, while the mean is allowed to
change. In the moderate experiment (graph 5c) we increase average farm size by 10 % in
all counties. The result is a modest counterfactual increase in the number of cooperatives
in all districts, suggesting that most counties were below the hump. In the radical experi-
56District numbers correspond to those defined in table D.1.
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(a) Counterfactual without district fixed effects
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(b) Counterfactual with western Prussian land inequality
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(c) Counterfactual with 10% farm size increase
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(d) Counterfactual 50% farm size increase
Figure 5: Data outcomes and counterfactual scenarios: final number of cooperatives in 1913 at the district
level.
ment (graph 5d), we increase farm sizes by 50 %. In this case, the negative impact of the
quadratic term on farm size dominates in some regions. While districts marked by small
farms gain a lot, others see a counterfactual decrease in cooperative activity. As in the-
ory, large increases in assets causes potential borrowers to substitute bank for small-scale
cooperative credit.
5 Conclusion
Starting from a simple theoretical framework, we have derived a number of factors that
explain the development of rural micro credit both across time and space. We provided
empirical evidence on the development of micro finance in a free market benchmark case
without public ownership, subsidization and under a minimal regulatory environment: the
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six eastern provinces of Prussia between 1852 and 1913. Our results show that asset sizes,
asset inequality, interest rates, and relative prices of agricultural staples explain a large
share of the variation in credit cooperatives. We argued that these price movements can be
seen as one driver of structural transformation, and that micro credit can potentially play a
part in rural adaption to this transformation.
We briefly point to two extensions and one implication of our findings.
Firstly, our approach has explained the development of micro credit institutions as
partly depending on complementary financial infrastructure from banks. However, we
have not accounted for informal village money lenders, partly because such data is lack-
ing for our period. A recent literature studies the impact of competition between MFIs
and money lenders on market outcomes, including interest rates (Mookherjee and Motta,
2016; Demont, 2016). It would be interesting to extend our results in this dimension and
examine how the entry decisions of MFIs depends on existing informal money lending.
Secondly, although we have considered economic inequality and ethnic heterogeneity,
we have abstracted from many other individual characteristics of potential borrowers. As
Ghatak (1999) has classically shown, information about individual-level riskiness can in-
fluence group formation through assortative matching. Future research could investigate
to what extent regional differences in information dissemination, network structures and
group cohesion impact the dispersion of micro credit institutions.
Lastly, we discuss the implications of our focus on long-run structural transformation
for understanding the impact of micro credit. We have presented a scenario with two pro-
duction sectors available to farmers, with sector profitability trending in opposite direc-
tions. It follows, firstly, that micro credit uptake will only occur in a limited time frame,
namely when sector profits are close enough for switching to be feasible. Secondly, in
such a setting there is likely to be a market demand for medium term loans rather than
short term financing. Thirdly, if microcredit allows farmers to exit a declining sector, a
comparison between their pre- and post credit incomes will not necessarily reveal an "im-
pact" of microfinance on incomes. A more relevant outcome metric would be changes in
the sector of economic activity. In this sense, microfinance may be better understood as
aiding adaption to a changing environment (Goodspeed, 2016) or as broadening choices
(Banerjee et al., 2015), rather than as a tool allowing rural populations to escape poverty.
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A Mathematical proofs
We now allow the number of cooperatives 𝐶 to exceed one. In effect, producers can now
minimize the cost of capital by founding optimal clubs, subject to the constraints imposed
by the region’s population distribution. Given two ethnic groups, what is the optimal
number of clubs 𝐶, and their optimal composition in terms of 𝑁𝑐, 𝐻𝑐? Employing the
following two Lemmas is convenient:
LEMMA 1
Segregation (𝐻𝑐 = 0) is always optimal if 𝐶 = 2.
PROOF:
The claim is that the cost of capital is smaller under segregation (𝐻𝑐,𝑠, 𝑁𝐴; 𝐻𝑐,𝑠, 𝑁𝐵)
than under any alternative allocation (𝐻𝑐,1, 𝑁𝑐,1; 𝐻𝑐,2, 𝑁𝑐,2) if 𝐶 = 2:
(︂
𝑟𝑏 +
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁𝐴
+𝐻𝑐,𝑠
)︂
𝑁𝐴 +
(︂
𝑟𝑏 +
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁𝐴
+𝐻𝑐,𝑠
)︂
𝑁𝐵
<
(︂
𝑟𝑏 +
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁𝑐,1
+𝐻𝑐,1
)︂
𝑁𝑐,1 +
(︂
𝑟𝑏 +
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁𝑐,2
+𝐻𝑐,1
)︂
𝑁𝑐,2
Exploiting the fact that 𝐻𝑐,𝑠 = 0 under segregation, multiplying out the brackets
yields:
𝑟𝑏𝑁𝐴 +
1
𝛿𝑞
+ 𝑟𝑏𝑁𝐴 +
1
𝛿𝑞
< 𝑟𝑏𝑁𝑐,1 +
1
𝛿𝑞
+𝐻𝑐,1𝑁𝑐,1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑁𝑐,2 +
1
𝛿𝑞
+𝐻𝑐,2𝑁𝑐,2
Simplifying and eliminating yields:
𝑟𝑏(𝑁𝐴 +𝑁𝐵) < 𝑟𝑏(𝑁𝑐,1 +𝑁𝑐,2) +𝐻𝑐,1𝑁𝑐,1 +𝐻𝑐,2𝑁𝑐,2
Using the fact that 𝑁𝐴 + 𝑁𝐵 = 𝑁 and 𝑁𝑐,1 + 𝑁𝑐,2 = 𝑁 and eliminating surplus
terms:
0 < 𝐻𝑐,1𝑁𝑐,1 +𝐻𝑐,2𝑁𝑐,2
which is true unless (𝐻𝑐,1, 𝐻𝑐,2) = (0, 0), that is unless both alternative clubs are
perfectly segregated too. 
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is as follows: Consider the case of a very small linguistic
minority, consisting of two producers, setting up their own club, thus facing very high
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capital costs. But shifting one member of this minority into the larger club will incur both
a substantial size penalty on the remaining member as well as a heterogeneity penalty on
the larger club that cannot be compensated by the small size benefit gained by the large
club.
LEMMA 2
For two ethno-linguistic groups the optimal number of clubs is 𝐶 ≤ 2.
PROOF:
The claim is that 𝐶 > 2 can never be optimal in the presence of two ethnic groups.
We know from Lemma 1 that segregation is optimal for 𝐶 = 2. The proof is there-
fore a simple extension from the previous proof. For 𝐶 = 3 we would have:
(︂
𝑟𝑏 +
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁𝐴
+𝐻𝑐,𝑠
)︂
𝑁𝐴 +
(︂
𝑟𝑏 +
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁𝐴
+𝐻𝑐,𝑠
)︂
𝑁𝐵
<
(︂
𝑟𝑏 +
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁𝑐,1
+𝐻𝑐,1
)︂
𝑁𝑐,1+
(︂
𝑟𝑏 +
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁𝑐,2
+𝐻𝑐,1
)︂
𝑁𝑐,2+
(︂
𝑟𝑏 +
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁𝑐,3
+𝐻𝑐,3
)︂
𝑁𝑐,3
It is clear that adding any additional club to the right-hand side cannot negate the
inequality. 
The relevant decision for Proposition 2 is now between one mixed club (𝐶 = 1) and the
segregated option with 𝐶 = 2.
PROPOSITION 2
Founding two cooperatives rather one cooperative will minimize 𝑟𝑐 if:
𝑞𝐻𝑁𝑁 >
1
𝛿
PROOF:
We want to find the conditions under which 𝐶 = 2 will minimize capital costs.
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First note that if individual collateral 𝑞 ≥ 𝑞𝑇 , 𝐶 = 0, i.e. an individual solution with
bank loans, is always optimal compared to any cooperative by construction.
We also know from Lemma 2 that 𝐶 > 2 can be excluded.
𝐶 = 1, in turn, will offer higher costs than 𝐶 = 2 if:(︂
𝑟𝑏 +
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁
+𝐻𝑁
)︂
𝑁 >
(︂
𝑟𝑏 +
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁𝐴
)︂
𝑁𝐴 +
(︂
𝑟𝑏 +
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁𝐵
)︂
𝑁𝐵
Where we have made use of the result from Lemma 1 that under 𝐶 = 2, 𝐻𝑐 = 0.
Multiplying out:
𝑟𝑏 +
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁
+𝐻𝑁 > 𝑟𝑏
𝑁𝐴
𝑁
+
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁
+ 𝑟𝑏
𝑁𝐵
𝑁
+
1
𝛿𝑞𝑁
Eliminating and multiplying by N:
𝑟𝑏𝑁 +𝐻𝑁𝑁 > 𝑟𝑏(𝑁𝐴 +𝑁𝐵) +
1
𝛿𝑞
Using 𝑁𝐴 +𝑁𝐵 = 𝑁 , eliminating and rearranging:
𝑞𝐻𝑁𝑁 >
1
𝛿
which is the inequality proposed. 
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B Summary Statistics
Table B.1: Summary statistics: Dependent variables
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
credit cooperatives Total number of credit cooperatives 14632 5.241 8.574 0 63
Δ credit cooperatives Total number of credit cooperatives, change 14632 0.338 1.038 0 21
Production cooperatives Total number of production cooperatives 14632 0.828 2.014 0 21
Δ production cooperatives Total number of production cooperatives, change 14632 0.061 0.298 0 6
Other cooperatives Total number of non-credit cooperatives 14632 1.168 3.139 0 64
Δ other cooperatives Total number of non-credit cooperatives, change 14632 0.137 0.85 0 36
Δ unlimited cooperatives Number of cooperatives under unlimited liability, change 14632 0.288 0.975 0 21
Δ poor cooperatives Number of cooperatives with deposit size <100 Mark, change 14632 0.158 0.752 0 21
Δ rich cooperatives Number of cooperatives with deposit size≥100 Mark, change 14632 0.13 0.653 0 17
Δ dairy cattle county-level change in dairy cow headcount 1868-1906 236 3651.6 3373.4 -12744 21275
Δ beef cattle county-level change in beef cattle headcount 1868-1906 236 8781.9 7160.4 -23837 47929
Δ pigs county-level change in pigs headcount 1868-1906 236 21451.7 12855.7 -12962 71982
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Table B.2: Summary statistics: Independent variables
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Prices
grain prices Weighted rye & wheat prices / CPI 14632 0.259 0.099 0.015 0.719
Δ grain prices Weighted rye & wheat prices / CPI, change 14632 -0.003 0.034 -0.18 0.136
grain prices, US Weighted rye & wheat prices / CPI, USA 14632 0.305 0.148 0.013 1.046
Δ grain prices, US Weighted rye & wheat prices / CPI, USA, change 14632 -0.008 0.056 -0.232 0.226
grain prices, butter Weighted rye & wheat prices, butter deflator 14632 0.232 0.094 0.015 0.716
Δ grain prices, butter Weighted rye & wheat prices, butter deflator, change 14632 -0.002 0.037 -0.229 0.138
Grain price volatility 5-year moving average standard deviation ofΔ grain prices 14632 0.032 0.026 0.001 0.199
Other time varying variables
limited liability Co-ops eligible for limited liability (1889) 14632 0.403 0.491 0 1
central bank Central bank for credit co-ops founded (1895) 14632 0.306 0.461 0 1
incorporation Co-ops granted status as legal person (1867) 14632 0.758 0.428 0 1
population, varying Time varying county population, ’000 14632 55.283 42.463 14.312 1130.819
linguistic frac., varying Time varying population heterogeneity, index 14632 0.188 0.198 0 0.648
Δ banks 5-year moving average of bank foundations 12508 0.164 0.418 0 6
GDP growth Annual German GDP growth, % 14632 1.578 2.503 -3.798 7.842
GDP growth, UK Annual UK GDP growth, % 14632 1.014 2.502 -5.156 8.39
interest rate Annual mean commercial interest rate, % 8968 3.17 0.793 1.74 5.12
interest rate, UK Annual mean Bank of England discount rate, % 14632 3.644 1.125 2 7.333
Time invariant variables: demographics
population County population in 1890, ’000 14632 56.388 32.742 18.737 335.186
population growth County population growth, 1858-1910, % 14632 0.508 1.094 -0.467 11.641
Polish share Share of Polish speakers in 1890 14632 0.226 0.311 0 0.926
Protestant share Share of Protestants in 1890 14632 0.656 0.347 0.026 0.996
linguistic fractionalization Linguistic population heterogeneity in 1890, index 14632 0.183 0.199 0.001 0.633
religious fractionalization Religious population heterogeneity in 1890, index 14632 0.22 0.177 0.008 0.53
linguistic polarization Linguistic population heterogeneity in 1890, index 14632 0.349 0.375 0.002 0.995
population density Population density in 1900 14632 5.194 29.407 0.287 413.338
migration Net immigration, 1895-1905, % 14632 -4.319 5.474 -11.9 28.55
urbanization Share of population in urban settlements, 1868 14632 0.261 0.211 0 1
suburban County surrounding a town 14632 0.085 0.279 0 1
illiteracy Share of illiterates in the population, 1871 14632 0.162 0.115 0.017 0.597
Time invariant variables: land
farm size Mean farm size, 1882, hectares 14632 12.697 4.809 1.742 31.956
land inequality Share of total arable land in top size category, 1882 14632 0.451 0.172 0 0.821
land inequality (top 2) Share of total arable land in top 2 size categories, 1882 14632 0.529 0.169 0 0.903
Gini Gini index of farm size inequality, 1882 14632 0.799 0.079 0.424 0.952
rye share Share of total land used for rye, 1878 14632 0.144 0.04 0.014 0.236
wheat share Share of total land used for wheat, 1878 14632 0.03 0.03 0 0.158
rye share 1852 Share of total land used for rye, 1852 14632 0.143 0.039 0.015 0.227
wheat share 1852 Share of total land used for wheat, 1852 14632 0.026 0.027 0 0.145
soil quality Excellent share of agricultural land 14632 0.196 0.248 0 0.997
religious inequality Occupational inequality between confessions, 1882 14632 0.098 0.066 0.001 0.331
Time invariant variables: economic controls
banks, 1852 Total number of banks, 1852 14632 0.589 0.734 0 3
industrial employment Share of employment in manufacturing, 1882 14632 0.135 0.063 0.014 0.5
wages Mean daily wages, 1892, Mark 14632 1.287 0.244 0.85 2.5
income growth Growth in labor incomes per capita, 1880-1905 14632 89.026 16.473 36.452 145.794
public spending Share of public spending in total education spending, 1886 14632 0.59 0.276 0.02 1
pupil-teacher ratio Pupil-teacher ratio in schools, 1886 14632 78.233 13.389 49.153 120.214
Time invariant variables: geography
market potential Weighted distance to markets, 1868 14632 0.818 0.267 0.424 2.796
Berlin distance Great circle distance to Berlin, 100 km 14632 2.955 1.527 0.048 6.5
Raiffeisen distance Great circle distance to Neuwied, 100 km 14632 7.215 1.697 4.058 11.239
military settlers, mean Mean distance to medieval military settlements, 100 km 14632 3.284 1.341 1.058 5.784
military settlers, min. Min. distance to medieval military settlements, 100 km 14632 1.931 1.215 0.004 4.388
latitude Geographical latitude, decimal coordinates 14632 52.579 1.392 49.52 55.72
longitude Geographical longitude, decimal coordinates 14632 17.059 2.408 11.87 22.57
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Figure C.1: Rye and wheat price differential and aggregated grain prices, deflated by consumer prices, index
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Figure C.2: Grain prices deflated by consumer prices, first differences
46
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
Pr
ic
e 
in
de
x 
(18
52
 = 
10
0)
1852 1913
year
German grain prices deflated by CPI
US grain prices deflated by CPI
Figure C.3: Grain prices deflated by consumer prices, German and US prices
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Figure C.4: German and US volatility of grain prices over time, deflated by consumer prices
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Figure C.6: German and United Kingdom real GDP growth rates
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Figure C.7: Urban and county savings banks in the six provinces
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D Administrative divisions
Table D.1: Administrative divisions: the eastern six provinces of Prussia
Prov. # Province District # District Counties per district
1 Posen 1 Posen 26
2 Bromberg 14
2 West Prussia 3 Danzig 12
4 Marienwerder 15
3 Pomerania 5 Stettin 13
6 Köslin 13
7 Stralsund 5
4 Silesia 8 Breslau 25
9 Liegnitz 21
10 Oppeln 20
5 East Prussia 11 Königsberg 20
12 Gumbinnen 16
6 Brandenburg 13 Potsdam 16
14 Frankfurt (Oder) 20
Total 236
Administrative divisions are as used in the empirical analysis, and reflect status of
1900. Small independent towns and their surrounding county are grouped together.
Berlin and counties becoming part of Berlin before 1914 are excluded.
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E Maps
(a) Number of credit cooperatives (b) Population, ’000
(c) Rye and wheat cultivation, % of total land (d) Number of banks
Figure E.1: Count of credit cooperatives and selected independent variables, 1913
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(a) Inequality: share of land under large landowners (b) Mean farm size, hectares
(c) Linguistic fractionalization, index (d) Religious polarization
Figure E.2: Selected independent variables, 1913
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F Additional results
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Table F.1: Determinants of credit cooperative growth, county level, Prussia: Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wages &
income growth
migration &
illiteracy
population
density &
growth
Latitude &
Longitude
Time varying
population &
heterogeneity
Population &
heterogeneity
fixed in 1852
Dependent Variable: Number of new credit cooperatives per county
Δ grain prices -38.2366*** -38.4741*** -38.6381*** -38.5431*** -38.6481*** -38.1804***
(3.0214) (3.0209) (3.0286) (3.0648) (3.0413) (3.0046)
limited liability 1.5916*** 1.5923*** 1.5929*** 1.5926*** 1.5868*** 1.5911***
(0.1539) (0.1537) (0.1537) (0.1539) (0.1539) (0.1538)
central bank 1.3891*** 1.3887*** 1.3883*** 1.3882*** 1.3683*** 1.3898***
(0.1410) (0.1410) (0.1409) (0.1411) (0.1411) (0.1410)
incorporation 0.0660 0.0670 0.0678 0.0675 0.0598 0.0656
(0.1312) (0.1313) (0.1313) (0.1313) (0.1313) (0.1312)
population 0.0086*** 0.0082*** 0.0090*** 0.0069***
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0013)
ling. fractionalisation 0.1226 0.1475 0.2414+ 0.1216
(0.1427) (0.1476) (0.1280) (0.1537)
farm size 0.0777* 0.1228*** 0.1015** 0.1384*** 0.1020** 0.0721**
(0.0357) (0.0326) (0.0322) (0.0342) (0.0339) (0.0264)
farm size squared -0.0021+ -0.0035** -0.0026* -0.0038** -0.0029* -0.0019*
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0009)
land inequality -0.6882*** -0.7622*** -0.8057*** -0.8866*** -0.7871*** -0.6137**
(0.1935) (0.2118) (0.2053) (0.2109) (0.2158) (0.1870)
wages -1.0554***
(0.2281)
income growth -0.0016
(0.0013)
Protestant share 0.0127
(0.1586)
urbanisation -1.0980*** -1.3080*** -1.4033*** -1.3868*** -1.2479*** -1.0874***
(0.2509) (0.2684) (0.2790) (0.2718) (0.3008) (0.2653)
suburbs -0.0753 -0.0340 -0.0305 -0.1292 -0.0373 0.0857
(0.1228) (0.0949) (0.0931) (0.1151) (0.1381) (0.1163)
migration -0.0283***
(0.0061)
illiteracy -0.5723
(0.4059)
Berlin distance 0.0295
(0.0458)
population density -0.0010
(0.0021)
population growth -0.1194***
(0.0266)
latitude 0.1020+
(0.0581)
longitude -0.0287
(0.0348)
population, varying 0.0015*
(0.0006)
ling. frac., varying 0.1845
(0.1871)
population, 1852 0.0000**
(0.0000)
ling. frac., 1852 0.1730
(0.1412)
District F.E. X X X X X X
Urbanization controls X X X X X X
Observations 14632 14632 14632 14632 14632 14632
Sample: Six eastern provinces of Prussia, 1852-1913. Dep. Var. year-on-year change in number of credit
cooperatives per county; grain prices are the year-on-year change of the moving average of weighted rye and
wheat prices lagged over the past five years, deflated by the consumer price index. Limited liability, central bank
and incorporation are time variant policy dummies. Population and fractionalization in (5) are time varying.
Other variables are time invariant. Urbanization controls include the share of the population in urban areas and a
dummy for suburban counties. See tables B.1 and B.2 definitions. All regressions are Poisson. Standard errors
clustered at county level (236 counties). Fixed effects at the level of 14 districts. All regressions exclude Berlin.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table F.2: Determinants of credit cooperative growth, county level, Prussia: Farm size and
farm value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Interaction
with
soil quality
Interaction
with
market potential
Interaction
with
industrialization
Interaction
with
migration
Interaction
with
decadal trends
Dependent Variable: Number of new credit cooperatives per county
Δ grain prices -38.4552*** -38.3691*** -38.3399*** -38.4820*** -30.0960***
(3.0559) (3.0575) (3.0549) (3.0161) (2.9856)
population 0.0068*** 0.0083*** 0.0065*** 0.0084*** 0.0067***
(0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013)
ling. fractionalisation 0.1450 0.1058 0.1187 0.0663 0.1510
(0.1537) (0.1433) (0.1513) (0.1437) (0.1527)
farm size 0.1502*** 0.1000* 0.1310* 0.1279***
(0.0367) (0.0456) (0.0535) (0.0339)
farm size squared -0.0041** -0.0040** -0.0036* -0.0035** -0.0041***
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0013)
land inequality -0.7587*** -0.8022*** -0.8889*** -0.8466*** -0.8489***
(0.1981) (0.1949) (0.2073) (0.1981) (0.2024)
soil quality 0.4634
(0.4356)
farm size× soil quality -0.0383
(0.0408)
market potential -0.9178*
(0.4094)
farm size× market potential 0.0532
(0.0414)
industrial employment -0.6753
(1.2159)
farm size× industrial employment -0.0043
(0.1266)
migration -0.0330*
(0.0140)
farm size× migration 0.0004
(0.0014)
-1854× farm size -0.1862
(0.1236)
1855-1864× farm size 0.1630***
(0.0364)
1865-1874× farm size 0.1997***
(0.0350)
1875-1884× farm size 0.1287***
(0.0352)
1885-1894× farm size 0.1750***
(0.0398)
1895-1904× farm size 0.1550***
(0.0350)
1905-1913× farm size 0.1218***
(0.0356)
District F.E. X X X X X
Urbanization controls X X X X X
Policy dummies X X X X X
Observations 14632 14632 14632 14632 14632
Sample: Six eastern provinces of Prussia, 1852-1913. Dep. Var. year-on-year change in number of credit
cooperatives per county; grain prices are the year-on-year change of the moving average of weighted rye and
wheat prices lagged over the past five years, deflated by the consumer price index. Limited liability, central bank
and incorporation are time variant policy dummies. Other variables are time invariant. Urbanization controls
include the share of the population in urban areas and a dummy for suburban counties. See tables B.1 and B.2
definitions. All regressions are Poisson. Standard errors clustered at county level (236 counties). Fixed effects at
the level of 14 districts. All regressions exclude Berlin.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.00155
Table F.3: Determinants of credit cooperative growth, county level, Prussia: Prices robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full
fixed
effects
Land use
fixed at
sample start
Instrument
with US
prices
Instrument,
controlling for
price
volatility
Instrument
land use
with soil
quality
Deflating by
butter
prices
Dependent Variable: Number of new credit cooperatives per county
Δ grain prices -38.3070** -39.6746***
(13.5937) (3.1124)
Δ grain prices, 1852 land -39.2433*** -36.0025*** -26.3261***
(3.1138) (5.0490) (5.4315)
Δ grain prices, butter deflator -37.9594***
(3.1462)
Price volatility, 1852 land 11.1721***
(1.9258)
limited liability 1.5920*** 1.5714*** 1.4701*** 1.6004*** 1.6056***
(0.1539) (0.1542) (0.1514) (0.1536) (0.1546)
central bank 1.3869*** 1.4028*** 1.7156*** 1.3824*** 1.3872***
(0.1412) (0.1435) (0.1514) (0.1407) (0.1415)
incorporation 0.0672 -0.1375 0.2308 0.0763 0.1766
(0.1313) (0.1421) (0.1530) (0.1310) (0.1337)
population 0.0067*** 0.0067*** 0.0069*** 0.0068*** 0.0067***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
ling. fractionalisation 0.1448 0.1460 0.1076 0.1477 0.1470
(0.1525) (0.1524) (0.1532) (0.1519) (0.1528)
farm size 0.1408*** 0.1419*** 0.1162** 0.1403*** 0.1427***
(0.0349) (0.0347) (0.0359) (0.0347) (0.0348)
farm size sq -0.0039** -0.0039** -0.0032* -0.0039** -0.0039**
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
land inequality -0.8460*** -0.8444*** -0.8461*** -0.8492*** -0.8445***
(0.2019) (0.2018) (0.2015) (0.2014) (0.2023)
Year F.E. X
County F.E. X
District F.E. X X X X X
Urbanization controls X X X X X
Observations 14632 14632 13688 13688 14632 14632
Sample: Six eastern provinces of Prussia, 1852-1913. Dep. Var. year-on-year change in number of credit cooperatives per county;
grain prices are the year-on-year change of the moving average of weighted rye and wheat prices lagged over the past five years,
deflated by the consumer price index. "Grain prices, 1852 land use" weighs rye and wheat prices using 1852 land use. "Grain
prices, butter deflator", deflates rye and wheat prices using butter prices. Price volatility is the five year standard deviation of the
change in deflated rye and week prices, weighed by 1852 land use. Specification (3) and (4) instrument grain prices with US grain
prices (available from 1856), using the 1852 land use weighting. (5) instruments wheat and rye land shares with county-level soil
suitability. Limited liability, central bank and incorporation are time varying policy dummies. Other variables are time invariant.
Urbanization controls include the share of the population in urban areas and a dummy for suburban counties. See tables B.1 and
B.2 for further definitions. Regressions (1), (2) and (6) are Poisson, (3) (4) and (5) are GMM. Standard errors clustered at county
level (236 counties). Fixed effects at the level of 14 districts. All regressions exclude Berlin.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table F.4: Determinants of credit cooperative growth, county level, Prussia: Reduced forms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Grain prices
with soil
quality
interaction
US grain
prices
US grain
prices with
US price
volatility
UK
GDP growth
Bank of
England
interest
rates
Mean distance
to medieval
military
settlements
Min. distance
to medieval
military
settlements
Dependent Variable: Number of new credit cooperatives per county
Δ grain prices -34.2597*** -28.2212*** -38.2809*** -38.2810***
(2.9776) (2.8426) (3.0493) (3.0473)
Δ grain prices, soil qual. -7.0706***
(0.5827)
Δ US grain prices -20.1711*** -11.4757***
(2.3631) (2.3619)
US price volatility 22.2255***
(2.9418)
GDP growth, UK 0.0489***
(0.0109)
interest rate, UK -0.2335***
(0.0324)
limited liability 1.5930*** 1.4479*** 1.1797*** 1.5819*** 1.4840*** 1.5912*** 1.5912***
(0.1535) (0.1515) (0.1473) (0.1537) (0.1479) (0.1541) (0.1541)
central bank 1.3914*** 1.5616*** 1.8991*** 1.3594*** 1.5126*** 1.3896*** 1.3896***
(0.1409) (0.1372) (0.1414) (0.1408) (0.1391) (0.1412) (0.1412)
incorporation 0.0623 -0.2083 0.3141* 0.0913 -0.2355+ 0.0662 0.0662
(0.1310) (0.1327) (0.1421) (0.1321) (0.1379) (0.1312) (0.1312)
population 0.0065*** 0.0066*** 0.0056*** 0.0054***
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0016)
ling. fractionalisation 0.1145 0.1427 0.3504* 0.3516*
(0.1567) (0.1555) (0.1571) (0.1543)
farm size 0.1481*** 0.1496*** 0.1727*** 0.1754***
(0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0377) (0.0380)
farm size sq -0.0041*** -0.0041*** -0.0056*** -0.0056***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0015)
land inequality -0.8070*** -0.7665***
(0.2065) (0.2059)
military settlers, mean 0.1604*
(0.0782)
military settlers, min 0.1701*
(0.0853)
District F.E. X X X X
County F.E. X X X
Urbanization controls X X X
Observations 14508 13806 14508 14508 14632 14632
Sample: Six eastern provinces of Prussia, 1852-1913. Dep. Var. year-on-year change in number of credit cooperatives per county; grain
prices are the year-on-year change of the moving average of weighted rye and wheat prices lagged over the past five years, deflated by the
consumer price index. "Grain prices, soil quality" interacts German grain prices with county-level soil quality. "US grain prices" carries out
same procedure using US rye and wheat prices. US Price volatility is the five year standard deviation of the change in deflated US rye and
wheat prices (available from 1856). Limited liability, central bank and incorporation are time varying policy dummies. UK GDP growth is
lagged by one year. BoE interest rate refers to the discount rate. Other variables are time invariant. Distance to medieval military settlements
measures mean or shortest parth geodesic distance between a county capital and medieval crusader settlements. Urbanization controls include
the share of the population in urban areas and a dummy for suburban counties. See tables B.1 and B.2 for further definitions. All regressions
are Poisson. Standard errors clustered at county level (236 counties). Fixed effects at the level of 14 districts. All regressions exclude Berlin.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table F.5: Determinants of cooperative growth, county level, Prussia: Credit
cooperative categories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Excluding
urbanized
counties
only
unlimited
liability
cooperatives
Cooperatives
with capital
contribution
< 100 RM
Cooperatives
with capital
contribution
≥ 100 RM
Dependent Variable: Number of new credit cooperatives per county
Δ grain prices -41.5987*** -41.9636*** -49.5009*** -33.9088***
(4.4561) (3.4360) (5.2061) (5.2181)
limited liability 1.8194*** 1.7190*** 2.9012*** 0.2819
(0.1949) (0.1721) (0.2847) (0.1863)
central bank 1.2295*** 1.2928*** 0.8847*** 2.2024***
(0.1966) (0.1496) (0.1724) (0.2088)
incorporation 0.2545 0.5508*** 1.3502*** 0.3297*
(0.1711) (0.1546) (0.3784) (0.1580)
population 0.0100*** 0.0060*** 0.0062** 0.0068**
(0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0022)
ling. fractionalisation 0.1004 0.1314 0.1059 0.2260
(0.1466) (0.1746) (0.2806) (0.3657)
farm size 0.1487*** 0.1659*** 0.1282+ 0.2731***
(0.0365) (0.0423) (0.0661) (0.0744)
farm size sq -0.0044*** -0.0044** -0.0035 -0.0076**
(0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0024)
land inequality -0.5799* -1.0469*** -0.6540+ -1.6755***
(0.2647) (0.2391) (0.3553) (0.4470)
District F.E. X X X X
Urbanization controls X X X X
Observations 7316 14632 14632 14632
No. of cooperatives 2617 4212 2307 1905
Sample: Six eastern provinces of Prussia, 1852-1913. Dep. Var.: year-on-year change in
number of credit cooperatives (of various characteristics) per county; grain prices refers to
the year-on-year change of the moving average of weighted rye and wheat prices lagged
over the past five years, deflated by the consumer price index. Limited liability, central
bank and incorporation are time varying policy dummies. Other variables are time invariant.
Urbanization controls include the share of the population resident in urban areas and a
dummy for suburban counties. Regression (1) excludes all counties with urbanisation above
the median. See tables B.1 and B.2 in the appendix for further definitions. All specifications
are Poisson. Standard errors clustered at county level (236 counties). Fixed effects at the
level of 14 districts. All regressions exclude Berlin.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table F.6: Determinants of credit cooperative growth, county level, Prussia: Sample robustness over
time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Only years
after 1860
Excluding spike
1895 & 1896
Only years
before
1895 spike
Only years
after
1895 spike
US prices,
only years
before
1879 tariffs
US prices,
only years
after
1879 tariffs
Dependent Variable: Number of new credit cooperatives per county
Δ grain prices -39.8564*** -11.3822*** -30.3729*** -40.5544***
(3.2412) (3.0372) (5.0569) (3.4742)
Δ grain prices, US -7.6074** -26.8687***
(2.9069) (3.3405)
limited liability 1.6017*** 1.0806*** 1.5379*** 1.7719***
(0.1544) (0.1602) (0.1591) (0.2563)
central bank 1.3814*** 1.6791*** 1.5631***
(0.1414) (0.1720) (0.1372)
incorporation -0.5972*** -0.0889 0.0080 -0.1410
(0.1327) (0.1303) (0.1381) (0.1112)
population 0.0067*** 0.0075*** 0.0041** 0.0071*** 0.0051*** 0.0068***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0014)
ling. fractionalisation 0.1502 0.0083 0.4655 0.0995 -0.2168 0.1933
(0.1531) (0.2051) (0.4240) (0.1990) (0.3364) (0.1646)
farm size 0.1420*** 0.1644*** 0.2399** 0.1160*** 0.2174*** 0.1497***
(0.0352) (0.0298) (0.0802) (0.0340) (0.0564) (0.0372)
farm size squared -0.0039** -0.0050*** -0.0060* -0.0033** -0.0080*** -0.0040**
(0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0014)
land inequality -0.8531*** -0.7109** -2.3437*** -0.5151* -0.8100* -0.8116***
(0.2032) (0.2273) (0.3911) (0.2429) (0.3957) (0.2184)
District F.E. X X X X X X
Urbanization controls X X X X X X
Observations 12744 13688 10148 4484 5428 8496
Sample: Six eastern provinces of Prussia, 1852-1913. Dep. Var. year-on-year change in number of credit cooperatives per
county; grain prices are the year-on-year change of the moving average of weighted rye and wheat prices lagged over the
past five years, deflated by the consumer price index. (5) and (6) use US instead of German grain prices. Limited liability,
central bank and incorporation are time variant policy dummies. Other variables are time invariant. Urbanization controls
include the share of the population in urban areas and a dummy for suburban counties. See tables B.1 and B.2 for further
definitions. All regressions are Poisson. Standard errors clustered at county level (236 counties). Fixed effects at the level
of 14 districts. All regressions exclude Berlin.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table F.7: Determinants of credit cooperative growth, county level, Prussia: Sample robustness
over space
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dropping
Posen
Dropping
West Prussia
Dropping
Pomerania
Dropping
Silesia
Dropping
East Prussia
Dropping
Brandenburg
Dependent Variable: Number of new credit cooperatives per county
Δ grain prices -37.9784*** -38.4256*** -39.8508*** -35.7485*** -36.9494*** -41.0139***
(3.5237) (3.2005) (3.2762) (3.6413) (3.1946) (3.2604)
limited liability 1.7872*** 1.6812*** 1.6151*** 1.1105*** 1.6281*** 1.6138***
(0.1727) (0.1630) (0.1573) (0.1710) (0.1762) (0.1640)
central bank 1.3203*** 1.3527*** 1.2604*** 1.6141*** 1.5814*** 1.2956***
(0.1528) (0.1478) (0.1426) (0.1700) (0.1634) (0.1503)
incorporation -0.1259 0.0175 0.2155 0.1854 -0.0936 0.1949
(0.1529) (0.1438) (0.1358) (0.1528) (0.1266) (0.1486)
population 0.0059*** 0.0066*** 0.0068*** 0.0078*** 0.0073*** 0.0070***
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0017)
ling. fractionalisation -0.0766 0.1663 0.1705 0.1764 0.3251+ 0.2128
(0.1576) (0.1670) (0.1542) (0.2084) (0.1751) (0.1598)
farm size 0.1093** 0.1438*** 0.1366*** 0.1827*** 0.1679*** 0.1389***
(0.0360) (0.0399) (0.0351) (0.0528) (0.0333) (0.0344)
farm size squared -0.0032* -0.0039* -0.0035** -0.0049** -0.0051*** -0.0037**
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0013)
land inequality -0.7652*** -0.8443*** -0.8449*** -0.6801** -0.8827*** -1.0717***
(0.2073) (0.2182) (0.2104) (0.2526) (0.2286) (0.2075)
District F.E. X X X X X X
Urbanization controls X X X X X X
Observations 12152 12958 12710 10540 12400 12400
Sample: Six eastern provinces of Prussia 1852-1913, dropping one province per regression. Dep. Var. year-on-year
change in number of credit cooperatives per county; grain prices are the year-on-year change of the moving average of
weighted rye and wheat prices lagged over the past five years, deflated by the consumer price index. Limited liability,
central bank and incorporation are time variant policy dummies. Other variables are time invariant. Urbanization controls
include the share of the population in urban areas and a dummy for suburban counties. See tables B.1 and B.2 for
further definitions. Regressions (2), (3), and (4) are county fixed effect Poisson regressions (234 counties), (1), (5) and
(6) are Poisson with fixed effects at the level of 14 districts. Standard errors clustered at county level (236 counties). All
regressions exclude Berlin.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
60
Table F.8: Determinants of credit cooperative growth, county level, Prussia: Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poisson,
zero-inflated
Poisson,
zero-inflated
with controls
Negative
Binomial
Negative
Binomial
zero-inflated
Ordinary
Least
Squares
Ordinary
Least
Squares,
logarithmic
Dependent Variable: Number of new credit cooperatives per county ln(new coops + 0.01)
Δ grain prices -33.2849*** -32.9996*** -36.9780*** -36.0901*** -2.1215*** -2.0859***
(2.8135) (2.8094) (2.8135) (2.8073) (0.1714) (0.6300)
limited liability 1.5785*** 1.5721*** 1.5374*** 1.5365*** 0.0842***
(0.1607) (0.1596) (0.1459) (0.1465) (0.0114)
central bank 1.3582*** 1.3623*** 1.4393*** 1.4318*** 0.3396***
(0.1506) (0.1482) (0.1274) (0.1294) (0.0195)
incorporation 0.0260 0.0258 0.0287 0.0257 -0.0063
(0.1321) (0.1319) (0.1308) (0.1309) (0.0039)
population 0.0028* 0.0023+ 0.0079*** 0.0057***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0014)
ling. fractionalisation 0.2519 0.2393 0.1157 0.1407
(0.1678) (0.2146) (0.1552) (0.1399)
farm size 0.1414*** 0.1402*** 0.1688*** 0.1655***
(0.0343) (0.0337) (0.0400) (0.0357)
farm size squared -0.0038** -0.0039** -0.0045** -0.0044**
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0013)
land inequality -1.0152*** -1.2902*** -1.0984*** -1.1044***
(0.1929) (0.2342) (0.2220) (0.1959)
ln(population) 0.1308*** 0.1308***
(0.0150) (0.0150)
ln(ling. fractionalisation) 0.0025 0.0025
(0.0025) (0.0025)
ln(farm size) 0.2742*** 0.2742***
(0.0521) (0.0522)
ln(farm size squared) -0.0450*** -0.0451***
(0.0124) (0.0125)
ln(land inequality) -0.0146** -0.0146**
(0.0045) (0.0045)
District F.E. X X X X X X
Year F.E. X
Urbanization controls X X X X X X
Observations 14632 14632 14632 14632 14632 14632
Sample: Six eastern provinces of Prussia, 1852-1913. Dep. Var. year-on-year change in number of credit cooperatives
per county; grain prices are the year-on-year change of the moving average of weighted rye and wheat prices lagged
over the past five years, deflated by the consumer price index. Limited liability, central bank and incorporation are time
variant policy dummies. Other variables are time invariant. Urbanization controls include the share of the population in
urban areas and a dummy for suburban counties. Regression (1) is a zero-inflated Poisson with population in the logit
predicting zero occurrences. Regression (2) is a zero-inflated Poisson with population, ethnic fractionalization, farm
size and land inequality in the logit predicting zero occurrences. (3) is a Negative Binomial specification, and (4) is a
zero-inflated Negative Binomial with population in the logit predicting zero occurrences. (5) Ordinary Least Squares
(6) Ordinary Least Squares on the natural logarithm of new credit cooperatives and a small constant. See tables B.1
and B.2 for further definitions. Standard errors clustered at county level (236 counties). Fixed effects at the level of 14
districts. All regressions exclude Berlin.
Standard errors in parentheses: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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G Historical and institutional background
G.1 The six eastern provinces of Prussia
The focus of our study is on the eastern regions of Prussia from the second half of
the 19th century until the First World War. Compared to the rest of Prussia, the re-
gions east of the river Elbe had low levels of urbanization and stayed predominantly
agricultural until 1914. Accordingly, they lagged behind other parts of Prussia in
terms of income, and exhibited high land inequality. Tables G.1 and G.2 provide a
comparison of the eastern regions in our sample with the remainder of Prussia at the
district level.
As we see, there was also substantial heterogeneity within the eastern provinces.
The city of Berlin, located in Brandenburg, was growing rapidly since the end of the
1850s to become one of Europe’s largest financial and industrial centers. In addition,
Upper Silesia in the southeast of Prussia was industrializing around booming coal
mines and iron ore production (Kiesewetter, 2004, pp. 181 ff.) . However, most
parts of the eastern provinces were characterized by agriculture, dominated by grain
production.
G.2 Rural transformation
From the 1850s onwards, this rural economy faced growing pressure to change and
adjust from several sides. First, the modernization of the Prussian and later German
state led to a rising tax burden, which in turn required peasants to produce a larger
marketable surplus (Wygodzinski (1911, p. 128), Ullmann (2005, p. 81)). Second,
the growth of industry in centers like Berlin, Saxony, Silesia or the Ruhr attracted
agricultural labor and thus increased the opportunity costs of work in agriculture
(Grant, 2006, pp. 97ff). Peasants and agricultural workers had now the option to
leave and find work in a factory, and many did. Related to this, income growth
in cities and industrial regions contributed to a strong increase in the demand for
products of animal origin such as meat and dairy products. This created new op-
portunities for agriculture, but it also made old types of agricultural production less
attractive. The third and arguably most powerful driver for rural transformation was
the decline of grain prices, both in relative and in absolute terms due to interna-
tional market integration. The average prices for wheat and rye in Prussia declined
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Table G.1: Eastern and western districts of Prussia, part 1: Population Statistics
Population Population Density Urban share Income p.c.
District 1867 1900 1867 1900 1875 1900 1880 1905
Prussia east of the river Elbe
Königsberg 1,063,340 1,204,386 0.50 0.57 27.70 34.11 260.05 474.76
Gumbinnen 744,778 792,240 0.47 0.50 12.73 18.44 213.86 417.02
Danzig 515,222 665,992 0.65 0.84 32.05 37.79 289.37 499.89
Marienwerder 767,620 897,666 0.44 0.51 21.56 25.73 218.50 436.42
Potsdam 550,895 1,929,304 0.27 0.94 36.89 47.98 394.87 805.61
Frankfurt 702,041 1,179,250 0.37 0.61 34.65 40.50 274.99 520.26
Stettin 993,428 830,709 0.82 0.69 37.57 48.55 330.46 610.67
Köslin 1,020,157 587,783 0.73 0.42 23.98 28.95 239.05 456.03
Stralsund 675,596 216,340 1.68 0.54 40.42 44.18 330.24 583.30
Posen 554,464 1,198,252 0.32 0.68 28.35 32.12 221.14 396.85
Bromberg 215,575 689,023 0.19 0.60 26.41 33.35 255.77 477.48
Breslau 1,364,632 1,697,719 1.01 1.26 31.83 41.93 259.14 472.15
Liegnitz 1,241,320 1,102,992 0.91 0.81 26.60 34.66 268.55 491.34
Oppeln 979,800 1,868,146 0.74 1.41 18.97 24.76 220.72 425.42
Prussia west of the river Elbe
Magdeburg 832,141 1,176,372 0.72 1.02 42.52 50.21 406.46 714.04
Merseburg 864,853 1,189,825 0.85 1.17 37.39 44.01 353.40 639.29
Erfurt 370,072 466,419 1.05 1.32 41.52 47.99 334.73 619.54
Schleswig 439,213 1,387,968 0.23 0.73 34.15 43.25 450.63 894.71
Hannover 477,122 647,908 0.84 1.13 32.02 55.55 391.94 724.23
Hildesheim 791,361 526,758 1.48 0.98 31.33 39.05 337.59 612.99
Lüneburg 596,493 472,598 0.53 0.42 20.12 29.05 368.59 756.56
Stade 1,243,902 375,017 1.83 0.55 7.75 23.47 423.04 791.16
Osnabrück 555,882 328,600 0.90 0.53 21.47 28.77 296.97 597.65
Aurich 578,889 240,058 1.86 0.77 22.59 29.35 362.66 633.90
Münster 480,192 699,583 0.66 0.96 25.68 31.98 347.02 666.21
Minden 981,718 636,875 1.87 1.21 26.37 33.47 319.08 660.39
Arnsberg 385,957 1,851,319 0.50 2.41 34.28 40.36 439.72 832.71
Kassel 410,210 890,142 0.41 0.88 29.71 34.83 336.80 642.07
Wiesbaden 381,712 1,007,839 0.68 1.79 38.08 52.67 473.78 956.30
Koblenz 301,407 682,454 0.49 1.10 22.21 23.66 383.95 704.81
Düsseldorf 264,475 2,599,806 0.48 4.75 58.57 62.33 452.94 852.72
Köln 193,876 1,021,878 0.49 2.57 38.14 55.07 408.86 793.90
Trier 770,569 840,696 1.07 1.17 16.21 19.09 379.05 710.72
Aachen 609,176 614,964 1.47 1.48 34.42 39.47 404.32 729.22
Sigmaringen 64,632 66,780 0.57 0.59 18.36 12.79 318.47 654.57
Berlin
Berlin 986,443 1,888,848 155.71 298.16 100.00 100.00 876.98 1,447.18
Population is headcount according to Prussian census, urban share is the share of population residing in urban
areas. Income per capita refers to annual labour income in Marks per worker. See table B.2 and text for further
definitions. Our sample includes counties in all districts (Regierungsbezirke) entirely east of the river Elbe,
and excludes Berlin. See table D.1 for more information on the administrative division of Prussia.
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Table G.2: Eastern and western districts of Prussia, part 2: Agricultural
Statistics
Agricultural share Land inequality Cows Pigs
District 1880 1905 1883 1906 1906
Prussia east of the river Elbe
Königsberg 0.57 0.47 0.45 318,997 713,134
Gumbinnen 0.71 0.61 0.33 228,964 610,484
Danzig 0.49 0.41 0.42 133,607 301,306
Marienwerder 0.65 0.58 0.52 241,382 644,141
Potsdam 0.39 0.21 0.38 247,371 659,594
Frankfurt 0.51 0.44 0.41 229,033 619,385
Stettin 0.46 0.39 0.53 177,362 543,426
Köslin 0.63 0.60 0.63 197,859 544,614
Stralsund 0.45 0.44 0.77 65,137 138,283
Posen 0.65 0.57 0.58 293,478 667,547
Bromberg 0.63 0.56 0.59 170,222 440,417
Breslau 0.42 0.33 0.44 312,827 457,330
Liegnitz 0.47 0.40 0.35 275,352 319,403
Oppeln 0.52 0.35 0.38 277,595 453,744
Prussia west of the river Elbe
Magdeburg 0.40 0.35 0.32 166,127 718,053
Merseburg 0.40 0.34 0.27 192,784 644,531
Erfurt 0.35 0.31 0.16 62,713 202,874
Schleswig 0.42 0.32 0.17 469,940 1,079,253
Hannover 0.40 0.31 0.07 112,533 568,145
Hildesheim 0.39 0.35 0.18 90,192 331,969
Lüneburg 0.58 0.48 0.07 143,717 622,087
Stade 0.55 0.46 0.03 113,726 399,412
Osnabrück 0.63 0.55 0.01 115,031 371,418
Aurich 0.50 0.50 0.03 93,323 132,985
Münster 0.51 0.33 0.03 159,177 459,133
Minden 0.51 0.37 0.09 128,769 503,438
Arnsberg 0.21 0.12 0.09 137,275 350,307
Kassel 0.47 0.40 0.11 185,470 648,640
Wiesbaden 0.35 0.25 0.02 140,661 206,801
Koblenz 0.50 0.45 0.02 134,903 168,331
Düsseldorf 0.19 0.10 0.03 179,870 463,620
Köln 0.32 0.19 0.05 100,084 99,753
Trier 0.50 0.39 0.03 161,117 264,028
Aachen 0.35 0.27 0.02 104,699 123,988
Sigmaringen 0.63 0.64 0.03 24,892 30,352
Berlin
Berlin 0.01 0.00 0.18 12,046 9,980
Agricultural share refers to share of working population employed in agriculture.
Cows and pigs are headcounts. See table B.2 and text for further definitions. Our
sample includes counties in all districts (Regierungsbezirke) entirely east of the river
Elbe, and excludes Berlin. See table D.1 for more information on the administrative
division of Prussia.
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in absolute terms from the mid-1850s, partly due to international competition from
grain producers from North America (O’Rourke, 1997). In consequence, relative to
consumer prices and to prices for meat and dairy products, grain prices continued to
decline strongly until the First World War (see figure 1, also (Federico, 2005, p. 28)).
With this, old extensive forms of agricultural production as well as subsistence
farming became unsustainable. Farmers faced a choice between giving up (for ex-
ample, migrating and looking for employment in industry) and investing into the
modernization of their business. The latter could mean an intensification of produc-
tion, a switch towards higher yielding products, such as meat or dairy, or a combi-
nation thereof. The costs involved in such a production switch were substantial. As
table G.3 shows, evaluated at the average rural wage rate, the price of one head of
beef cattle was equivalent to between 120 and 170 days of work. The purchase of
a pig would cost the equivalent of at least 1 month’s wage. The implication was a
strong increase in the demand for capital (Wygodzinski, 1911, p.129). Rural credit
cooperatives developed in response to this pressure in Germany from the 1850s on-
wards as an altogether new type of credit institution.
Table G.3: Cattle prices at the province level: Value per head of cattle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price of
Beef cattle
(Marks per head)
Price of
pigs
(Marks per head)
Rural
unskilled wage
(Marks per day)
Value of
Beef cattle
(days of labour)
Value of
Pigs
(Days of labour)
East Prussia 145 34 1.21 119.5 28.0
West Prussia 184 43 1.28 144.3 33.9
Brandenburg 203 61 1.34 151.7 45.4
Pomerania 242 68 1.43 169.3 47.6
Posen 172 55 1.22 141.3 44.9
Silesia 173 57 1.06 162.7 54.1
Mean (unweighted) 187 53 1.26 148.5 42.2
Cattle prices calculated from aggregate value of cattle (in Mark) and cattle headcount at the province level in 1883.
Source: Statistical Yearbook for the German Empire (Statistisches Amt, 1886, pp. 25-26) Daily wages for 1892 are
aggregated from the county level, see table B.2. Column (4) = (1)/(3), Column (5) = (2)/(3).
G.3 Sources of rural credit
Why could the demand for credit not be met by the existing sources of capital?
To start with, most peasants had little savings of their own (Kersting, F., Wolf, N.,
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Wohnsiedler, I., 2019). Next, peasants were unattractive debtors for several reasons.
Most importantly, many farmers had only limited assets, which could serve as collat-
eral. Furthermore, accounting practices were hardly known in these regions around
1850, and the valuation of assets was often difficult, for example regarding the value
of non-marketable livestock such as young horses, pigs or cows. Moreover, peasants
would often require small sums, but over comparatively long periods, due to harvest
cycles and the time to grow animals. This also implied that farmers were liquidity
constrained over much of the year. Taken together, the lack of (documented) collat-
eral, the small size of loans requested, and the need for relatively long-term credit
added to the risk of lending to farmers and prevented them from accessing private
banks. The remaining sources for credit were individual moneylenders, often whole-
sale traders, and saving banks (Wygodzinski (1911, pp. 132f.), Faust (1965a, pp.
328ff.)).
Rural moneylenders had a bad reputation at the time and were regularly accused
of usury. Interest rates of 30 percent or more were not uncommon (Verein für So-
cialpolitik (1887), also Guinnane (2001, p. 368)). We note that such accusations may
have reflected anti-Semitic sentiment, as many moneylenders were Jewish. Saving
banks did spread and prosper in the Eastern Provinces after 1850, but they were of-
ten reluctant to extend credit to farmers. The problem was not that they shied away
from risky maturity transformation implied by their often short-term deposits and
the demanded long-term loans from farmers. As reported by Wygodzinski (1911, p.
134), in 1907 savings banks in Prussia had only 3.53% of their capital invested in
personal credit and the remainder in securities (23.83%) and mortgages (60.49%).
More likely, savings banks considered lending to small farmers as unprofitable busi-
ness.
Credit cooperatives emerged as an institutional innovation to this situation (on the
following see Guinnane (2001)), pioneered by Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch (1808-
1883) and Wilhelm Raiffeisen (1818-1888). They shared a number of important
organizational features, which likely contributed to their long-run success and sur-
vival. While Schulze-Delitzsch focused on urban craftsmen, and Raiffeisen on rural
populations, both emphasized the principle of joint-liability lending (Faust, 1965a).
Moreover, most rural credit cooperatives following Raiffeisen retained unlimited li-
ability, even though limited liability became a legal option in 1889. Rural credit
cooperatives restricted their operations to a small geographic area and a small num-
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ber of people, similar to the "Regionalprinzip" of German savings banks. Finally,
most credit cooperatives served a double function of credit banks and savings. As
discussed in Banerjee et al. (1994), it was the combination of these characteristics
that helped to reduce the considerable risk of lending to farmers, because they pro-
vided monitoring incentives and simple yet efficient monitoring mechanisms - if
heterogeneity within their area of operation was limited.
The rural cooperative movement grew quickly in the decades before 1914, par-
ticularly in the 1880s and 1890s, probably helped by the cooperative law (1889) and
the foundation of the Preussenkasse, a central bank for cooperatives(1895). In 1913
there were around 19,000 credit cooperatives with a share of nearly 7% in total as-
sets of all financial institutions in Germany (Kluge (1991, p. 89), Tilly (1992)).
G.4 Operation of cooperatives: loan and collateral
A typical rural credit cooperative combined lending (Aktivgeschäft) and deposit busi-
ness (Passivgeschäft). Consider the aggregated balance sheets of all credit coopera-
tives organized into the "Verband der polnischen Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossen-
schaften in der Provinz Posen und Westpreussen" in table G.4.57 This is a rare in-
stance of consolidated microdata being available at the co-op level. The table shows
the development of loans, savings deposits and third party bank credit together with
the overall size of the balance sheet, 1873-1907. The number of cooperatives in-
creased from 43 (1873) to 225 (1907).
Several findings stand out. First, we see a very substantial increase in the total
volume of credit issued by member cooperatives of this association, in particular
from the 1890s onwards. Most part of the Aktivgeschäft of these credit cooperatives
consists of providing loans to their individual members (loans to non-members were
ruled out by law since 1889). In this region, it was common practice by both Ger-
man and Polish credit cooperatives to secure loans by financial bills (Wechsel) and
cosigners (Swart (1911, p. 139), Seidel (1897, p. 451)). The exact extent to which
such loans were collateralized is rarely known, but it is likely that collateralization
became more important in the Eastern Provinces over time. For example, the man-
agement committee of the Association decided in September 1907 to provide loans
57This roughly translates as "Association of Polish Economic Cooperatives in the Provinces of Posen and West Prussia".
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Table G.4: Aggregated Balance Sheets of Credit Cooperatives organized in "Association of Polish Cooper-
atives in Posen and West Prussia"
Year
Total
Balance Sheet
Loans
(Wechsel)
Share loans
in Activa
Saving Deposits
Banks
(external funding)
Share Saving deposits
in Passiva
Share Banks
in Passiva
Ratio
Savings to Loans
1873 3,739,303 3,321,408 0.89 2,600,870 377,411 0.696 0.101 0.783
1874 4,493,258 4,206,771 0.94 3,345,649 191,888 0.745 0.043 0.795
1875 4,664,843 4,522,160 0.97 3,414,437 289,877 0.732 0.062 0.755
1876 5,833,799 5,299,917 0.91 4,113,766 363,468 0.705 0.062 0.776
1877 6,333,792 6,046,207 0.96 4,533,591 355,089 0.716 0.056 0.750
1878 6,935,886 6,639,366 0.96 4,852,238 456,586 0.700 0.066 0.731
1879 6,894,557 6,393,654 0.93 4,860,377 296,676 0.705 0.043 0.760
1880 7,218,109 6,781,756 0.94 5,219,266 229,032 0.723 0.032 0.770
1881 8,827,849 8,245,228 0.93 6,489,611 229,243 0.735 0.026 0.787
1882 9,223,512 8,315,469 0.90 6,844,717 152,654 0.742 0.017 0.823
1883 10,718,589 10,109,503 0.94 7,937,405 240,720 0.741 0.022 0.785
1884 11,518,278 10,982,232 0.95 8,432,204 259,199 0.732 0.023 0.768
1885 11,890,343 11,334,393 0.95 8,676,014 245,629 0.730 0.021 0.765
1886 12,249,617 11,618,529 0.95 8,908,417 245,248 0.727 0.020 0.767
1887 13,343,992 12,559,960 0.94 9,652,998 259,028 0.723 0.019 0.769
1888 14,472,320 13,331,869 0.92 10,507,893 243,167 0.726 0.017 0.788
1889 15,265,872 13,783,108 0.90 11,121,626 332,281 0.729 0.022 0.807
1890 16,980,742 15,320,179 0.90 12,523,183 302,190 0.737 0.018 0.817
1891 18,942,662 16,650,523 0.88 12,661,911 970,879 0.668 0.051 0.760
1892 15,454,997 14,439,906 0.93 10,782,235 687,405 0.698 0.044 0.747
1893 19,162,825 16,671,612 0.87 13,106,546 593,848 0.684 0.031 0.786
1894 21,401,901 18,197,042 0.85 14,970,083 399,968 0.699 0.019 0.823
1895 24,379,510 20,379,160 0.84 16,774,448 779,923 0.688 0.032 0.823
1896 27,009,274 23,539,093 0.87 19,078,036 441,660 0.706 0.016 0.810
1897 32,825,358 27,923,547 0.85 22,325,160 1,444,052 0.680 0.044 0.800
1898 40,546,919 30,866,931 0.76 26,749,760 1,085,849 0.660 0.027 0.867
1899 46,647,161 38,390,725 0.82 32,462,061 2,104,363 0.696 0.045 0.846
1900 53,559,698 42,266,620 0.79 37,787,516 2,088,746 0.706 0.039 0.894
1901 60,347,493 48,151,082 0.80 42,248,506 3,024,011 0.700 0.050 0.877
1902 68,594,954 54,610,381 0.80 49,282,288 3,191,201 0.718 0.047 0.902
1903 80,771,179 52,278,119 0.65 58,908,668 1,726,624 0.729 0.021 1.127
1904 98,339,437 75,292,663 0.77 70,616,513 2,212,735 0.718 0.023 0.938
1905 117,623,657 87,685,799 0.75 87,421,051 2,986,025 0.743 0.025 0.997
1906 143,541,423 105,214,815 0.73 107,062,057 3,765,857 0.746 0.026 1.018
1907 164,441,955 127,232,979 0.77 123,004,213 5,060,369 0.748 0.031 0.967
Aggregated balance sheet data of the credit cooperatives belonging to the "Association" as gathered by Prussian authorities (Polizei Präsidium Posen, 1909). All amounts in Mark, unless noted as
share of total or ratio.
only on financial bills (Polizei Präsidium Posen, 1909, p.12). As argued by Swart
(1911, pp. 139f.), "financial bills" in the balance sheet often reflected mortgage
loans, which had been transformed into bills. More generally, some form of collat-
eral was required by Raiffeisen’s Musterstatut according to §31, which demanded
that cosigners of a loan had to own land or property that exceeded the value of the
loan by at least 1/3 (see also Kraus (1876, p. 32)).58
58The Musterstatut was a template for cooperative organisation designed by the central Raiffeisen orgranisation that local coopera-
tives could, but did not have to, adopt.
68
There is evidence that loans were typically secured by one or two cosigners, and
that in order to qualify as a cosigner, a person had to be known in terms of their
wealth and liabilities (Guinnane (2001, p.378), Schlütz (2013, p. 307)). Schlütz
(2013, pp. 300ff.) provides details on the Aktivgeschäft of credit cooperatives in
the Rhineprovince, which indicates that collateral, including land became more im-
portant over time. Von Altrock (1900) describes the credit operations of rural credit
cooperatives in the province of Brandenburg for the years 1897 and 1898 in some
detail. He reports for 101 credit cooperatives that were part of the Raiffeisen-system
the following: in 1897 they had provided loans over 1.72 Million Marks or 356
Mark per member. About 1.47 Million Mark of loans were provided for a fixed
term, where 28.4% for a term of up to 1 year, 48.4% for a term between 1 and 10
years and 23.2% for a term of more than 10 years. A total of 1.48 Million Mark of
those loans were secured by either cosigners or land, in particular 64.1% secured by
cosigners and 35.9% secured by land (Hypotheken, see Von Altrock (1900, p. 49)).
G.5 Relationship of cooperatives to banks and the state
Most important for the loan operation of credit cooperatives however, was the fact
that they combined the function of a credit bank with that of savings banks. Due
to their character of joint-liability institutions and the fact that most often the de-
posits of some members served as capital for the loans to others, the total assets
of members served as implicit collateral for their loan operations (Banerjee et al.,
1994). Sometimes, credit cooperatives used their total members’ collateral to ap-
proach third party funding institutions such as banks, but more often regional "cen-
tral banks" controlled by a larger group of credit cooperatives. This mattered espe-
cially for young, small credit cooperatives, which had not yet accumulated sufficient
saving deposits of their own. We see from table G.4 that for the first decades, credit
cooperatives, which were part of the Association, could serve about 80% of their
members’ total credit demand using the capital of their savings account. By the
turn of the century, the credit cooperatives in this sample had become on balance
financially "self-sufficient". Similarly, table G.4, shows that third party funding was
important early on, but declined in relative importance. More generally, it was the
Passivgeschäft with interest bearing saving deposits that enabled credit cooperatives
to engage in their Aktivgeschäft, providing loans (Schlütz, 2013, p. 352).
69
The loans provided were typically medium- to long-run, which stood in con-
trast to loans provided by moneylenders, saving banks or private banks (Wygodzin-
ski, 1911, pp. 139ff.). It seems that most credits were given for more than three
months, often up to 20 years with at least yearly installments of repayment (Kluge,
1991, p.191f). Schlütz (2013) shows that for several credit cooperatives in the Rhine
Province, loans provided for longer terms and larger amounts were becoming more
frequent during the two decades before 1914.
Credit cooperatives proved to be very resilient before 1914, with extremely low
failure rates. In particular, rural credit cooperatives failed less often than urban co-
operatives (Schlütz, 2013, p. 154). If they did so, this was typically either because
they were not part of a larger regional association, which could have helped to re-
finance their loans, or because they operated under limited liability. As reported in
Banerjee et al. (1994, p. 503), in 1909/10 out of 15,000 rural credit cooperatives
only three failed (all with limited liability). This resilience is all the more remark-
able, given that state intervention remained limited. Rural credit cooperatives were
never directly state subsidized, although many of them might have benefited from
cheap or free managerial labor, provided by local authorities such as state officials
or priests who voluntarily contributed their expertise and time to the cause. How-
ever, as argued in Guinnane (2001), this likely mattered only for the early years
of cooperatives and can hardly explain their long-run success. However, indirectly,
the state supported the credit cooperative movement in two important ways. First,
the state provided a legal framework, with the 1867 incorporation law bestowing
legal personhood unto cooperatives, and the 1889 law allowing cooperatives to opt
for limited liability (Faust, 1965a). Second, the foundation of the Preussenkasse in
1895, which was initially endowed with public resources helped to safeguard the
credit operations of cooperatives and their regional central banks as a refinancing
institution (Guinnane et. al., 2013, pp. 77ff.). However, as we see from table G.4
above, while this certainly mattered temporarily and for some credit cooperatives,
most of them were financially self-sufficient by the turn of century.
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